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 Recent events in Eastern Europe and the Middle East have prompted world leaders to 
opine that the world is entering a new Cold War.  These concerns are based on the recent 
invasions of Crimea and Ukraine, action in Syria, Russian rhetoric, and military posturing by 
both sides.   Russian history, strategy, and strategic culture provide context for the current 
state of affairs.  These do not, however, guarantee that the present implementation of strategy 
will mirror the past and that the goals are to return to a Soviet-style, Cold War-era, bipolar 
world order.  The issue is more complex then our own cognitive biases have allowed us to 
comprehend.  Russia is resurgent and does pose a threat to stability, but its goal is neither a 
Cold War nor a hot war.  Rather, it seeks to be treated as an equal and to reassert a greater 
level of control and influence over its former lands.      
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 Russia’s recent aggression and resurgent military power have left world leaders 
reeling.  Campaigns in Crimea, eastern Ukraine, and Syria, along with significant rhetoric 
directed at former Soviet and Warsaw Pact allies have caused a great deal of concern.  There 
is talk of a new Cold War and even rumblings of the potential for a hot war.  But are these 
concerns valid, or is Russia just using strong rhetoric and the occasional show of force to try 
to get its way?  Or is this simply how one should expect a resurgent Russia to act given 
Russian history and strategic culture?  World leaders seem to be concerned that their fears of 
another standoff, particularly in Eastern Europe, are at least somewhat valid.  Recent NATO 
exercises there have sought  to show Russia a cohesive, capable alliance.  Western states 
have also put in place substantial diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions.  
 World leaders’ fears are not baseless.  As Chapter One points out, Russia has a long 
and notable history of aggression toward its neighbors.  Since the late 19
th
 century Russian 
leaders have sought expanded influence and control over nations they consider either 
members of Russia or valuable to the larger Russian strategy of absolute control over Russia 
itself, dominance in near-abroad regions
1
, and a high degree of influence in the far abroad.
2
  
Many, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe, remember Russia’s decision to hold and, 
through surrogates, rule territory seized from the Germans in the waning days of World War 
II.  These nations remember the end of the Cold War also, as citizens pushed back against 
their occupiers and gained their freedom.  These nations are, rightfully, highly distrustful of 
Russia and its resurgence.   
                                                          
1
 A term developed after the collapse of the Soviet Union to describe former Soviet States. 
2
 A term that refers to nations that were not former Soviet States.  This can refer to former 
communist or Warsaw Pact nations, Western nations, and everyone else.   
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 Also of concern is Russian strategic culture and its associated grand strategy, both of 
which are highlighted in Chapter Two.  Russian strategic culture is expansionist and highly 
nationalistic.  Russians believe that their country  is exceptional, and that they have a right to 
rule or at least dominate neighboring territories.  This worldview translates into a strategy 
that includes all the elements of national power: military, information warfare, economic 
measures, and diplomacy.  Military posturing is the most notable to external parties, 
particularly as the invasions of Crimea and eastern Ukraine and military involvement in Syria 
have seized the attention of the West and countries in other regions.  Russian information 
warfare has also been significant in recent years.  In addition to information warfare in the 
conflicts, heavy propaganda has come from Russia’s English language media outlets whose 
sole purpose is to spread Kremlin perspectives to the many people who may not realize RT, 
an English language outlet formerly named Russia Today but shortened to “RT” to remove 
the blatant reference to Russia, is a Russian outlet.  Russia’s economic strategy has been a 
significant component of an ongoing effort to bend former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations’ 
wills to align with Russia’s.  Russian leaders have especially used the availability of natural 
gas and economic aid to exert their influence.  Finally, Russia has developed its own 
multinational organizations to provide a counter to groups such as the European Union (EU) 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  These groups allow them to expand 
foreign policy influence in a region inundated with Western foreign-policy efforts, although 
the strategy has not been very successful because Russia has been unable to add partners that 
do not rely solely on Russia.    
 Chapter Three examines the collapse of the once proud Soviet Union and the manner 
in which the landscape of Europe changed in subsequent years.  Western organizations began 
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drawing in various former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations and promoting Western interests 
in these countries shortly after the collapse.  Russia, still suffering from the economic fallout 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union, was largely opposed to the expansion but lacked the 
influence to stop it.  As the country recovered, Russian leaders began trying to influence 
events in their near abroad.  While many instances of political and economic subversion 
occurred early in the 21
st
 century, the first blatant instance of this was the successful – in  
terms of reestablishing Russia as a power player – Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008.  
Both during this conflict and in its aftermath Russia returned to its old and now widely 
accepted (though widely disliked) tactics.  The status quo remained until fall 2013 when 
Russia enticed Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych with a $15 billion aid package to 
forego an association agreement with the EU in favor of Russian alliances.  The subsequent 
protests threatened to throw Ukraine into a civil war, and by February 2014 Yanukovych had 
been removed from office and fled Kyiv.  Russia characterized the removal as a coup and 
gave safe harbor to Yanukovych while Russian officials planned their next move.  
 Chapter Four outlines the fallout of Yanukovych’s ouster.  The rapid takeover of 
Crimea, regardless of initial denials, was clearly coordinated by Russian leadership.  In less 
than a month Crimea was no longer part of Ukraine, and world leaders were left struggling to 
find more than a strongly worded response and economic sanctions in order to counter 
Putin’s bold move.  In early March the “uprising” moved to eastern Ukraine.  Russia engaged 
in an active information warfare campaign that included small amounts of support, at least 
initially, to the small factions of separatists.  Events in eastern Ukraine differed from those in 
Crimea.  Instead of a mostly bloodless annexation, Russia provided training and equipment 
to separatists to ensure they remained in the fight.  It would rapidly devolve into a bloody 
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civil war involving an early tragedy in the downing of a commercial airliner by a Russian 
surface to air missile.  Western leaders stuck mostly to scolding Putin and initiating more 
economic sanctions.  For his part Putin attempted to stir up tensions among ethnic Russians 
in the Baltics and ordered the Russian military to participate in aggressive military 
maneuvers reminiscent of Cold War days.  But for all this posturing, Russia did not engage in 
escalatory actions in another country the way it had in eastern Ukraine.  Instead, it 
established a new status quo, consolidating and building slowly and very carefully on its 
gains.   
 In fall 2015, Russia proved again that its military was surging regardless of sanctions.  
Chapter Five examines the value of Syria to Russian interests and the September 2015 
commitment of forces there.  Russian leaders saw an opportunity in Syria and seized it.  They 
protected their strategic interests (access to the port of Tartus as well as several major 
airfields) and economic interests (a long-standing military-sales program) by ensuring Assad 
remained in power.  They secured or regained access to facilities in the country that were 
strategically significant.  They also launched a propaganda battle that framed them as 
targeting the much reviled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) when in fact they were 
targeting anti-Assad forces.  The involvement also allowed them the opportunity to showcase 
the flexibility of their military, which was operating on two fronts (even though they actively 
denied the first), and their new weapons upgrades.  More importantly, it forced the West to 
engage them on the issue of Assad.  While the move was not overly shocking, the decision 
by Putin to target rebels, including civilians, sparked international condemnation.  
 Chapter Six seeks to answer the question of Russian motivation.  Why is Russia 
taking these actions?  Are Russian leaders trying to launch another Cold War, or maybe even 
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a hot war?  Do they truly plan on remedying the collapse of the Soviet Union?  The answer is 
not black and white, and Russian actions, regardless of motivations, could cause the situation 
to escalate rapidly into a devastating event for all parties involved.   
 However, understanding what is happening today requires a knowledge of Russia’s 
past.  The claims to Ukraine and Crimea, both of which have varying levels of legitimacy, go 
back much further than the Soviet Union.  Communist Russians’ desires to establish the 
Soviet Union in the first place were not just prompted by a despotic group’s search for 
empire.  The issues at play have a deep and at times complex history, but they are vital to 
understanding what is happening today and how it may play out.  And so this is where we 




 There is no shortage of available literature on Russia.  Even the recent events in 
Crimea and Ukraine have been written about by multiple authors publishing through 
prestigious publishing houses, and there are undoubtedly works in progress on the recent 
events in Syria.  The recency of some events, the evolution of media and government 
reportage, and the interaction between the two has provided a multitude of both primary and 
official documents from which to draw.  Endless articles exist that were written by journalists 
on the ground and in some cases in the fray, or released by outlets that had journalists on the 
ground.  Government investigations and public evidence are also widely available, largely 
due to the recognition of opposing governments that the Russian propaganda machine could 
only be countered with openness.  The propagation of social media and smart phones also 
allowed a unique component in the form of first-hand footage provided by citizens in 
Ukraine’s Euromaidan uprising and other major events. 
 In terms of primary sources I was limited only by language barriers.  I used the 
automated translating tools from Google where possible, and also tried to track down 
translated official documents.  Articles about events as they happened comprise a majority of 
my sources for the chapters dealing with Ukraine, Crimea, and Syria.  Most outlets are 
reputable with global influence, but since part of this thesis focuses on Russian information 
warfare, articles with a decidedly Russian perspective (Russian media) have been used and 
appropriately identified as such.  I accessed official press releases, interviews, investigations, 
and other resources when possible. The governments and organizations represented include 
(but were not limited to) the Netherlands, United States, NATO, EU, Ukraine, and Russia.  I 
also used a documentary made using footage from protestors in the Euromaidan, allowing a 
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unique perspective on what was happening on the ground and in the months leading up to 
Yanukovych’s ouster and how Ukraine so rapidly devolved into internal crisis, annexation of 
Crimea, and then a de facto insurgency in its eastern region supported directly by Russia.   
 Occasionally I did use books and journal articles to frame an issue, better understand 
components of Russian national power, or to help guide my primary source research.  While 
this is not a complete listing of my multitude of sources, it is a highlight of the books that 
served to guide me the most.  Orlando Figes’ work, Revolutionary Russia: 1891-1991, 
allowed me to develop an understanding of Russian politics and internal events from pre-
World War I to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  While much of the book did not apply to 
my thesis beyond the history of Russia this served as the complete work that provided 
context, particularly for the pre-WWI periods of Russian history, and guided further research.  
Tony Judt’s work titled Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 was my baseline for a 
knowledge of how the collapse of the Soviet Union came about.  His explanation of the 
political and social issues of the late eighties and early ninties guided me into a tumultuous 
period in world history that set the stage for the present day.  Andrew Wilson’s book Ukraine 
Crisis: What It Means for the West and Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer’s book Conflict in 
Ukraine served as my road maps from fall 2013 to early 2014 in Ukraine.  The information 
provided allowed me more effectively to seek out primary sources, and gave me a better 
understanding of the tumultuous relations that brought about the crisis.  All three authors also 
gave short insights into the larger implications for the West, although at the time of 
publication so much was still evolving on the ground that these perspectives were limited.   
 Three other books, Imperial Gamble by Marvin Kalb, The New Cold War by Edward 
Lucas, and Russia and the New World Disorder by Bobo Lo served as my primary readings 
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on the larger implications of the current Russian adventure for regional and global security.  I 
chose to not read too heavily into these books, beyond their framing of the issue, until I 
neared the end of my paper and had already framed in my own mind the issues relating to 
Russia.  My reasoning for this was that I wanted to develop an analytic opinion that was not 
formed on the basis of the ideas of others.  As an analyst I recognize the importance of 
looking at an issue through as unbiased a view as possible, and I recognize that many 
Western experts have a very pessimistic perspective on Russia that is influenced not only by 
current events, but by their own experiences during the Cold War.  My knowledge of Russia 
has been developed in a post-Cold War world that still focuses heavily on the Cold War 
period and what Russia was during that time.  My studies have taught me that while history is 
important, we cannot be handicapped by it.  Just because an issue evolved one way in the 
past does not mean it will evolve the same way today.  This is not to say the same underlying 
issues do not exist and that some tactics will not carry over, but rather that the larger 
manifestations of Russian strategy, and the reactions to it among other countries, will play 
out differently this time.    
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A SHORT HISTORY OF RUSSIA 
 
“History doesn’t teach any lessons, but greatly punishes one for not learning them.” Vasily 
Klyuchevsky (Russian Historian) 
 





 century phenomenon.  In fact, scholars in Russia and the West recognize 
expansionism and the associated aggression as a central part of Russia’s history from the 16
th
 
century to the present day.  Additionally, this aggression and expansionism was not an 
unprovoked event and can be traced back to the earliest periods of Russian history when the 
Slav predecessors to the modern Russian state were themselves subject to invasion.   
 Kievan Rus, Russia’s earliest form, suffered internal strife between the various 
members of the ruling family who sought to control the nation after the death of its leader.  
This internal conflict was accompanied by external invading forces of Kipchaks, Tartars, 
Swedes, and others that ended with the Mongol invasion that became the catalyst for collapse 




  The intermediate Russian predecessor, Muscovy, was established 
under Mongol rule and eventually was able to remove itself from the influence of the Mongol 
empire in the late 15
th
 century.  In the subsequent years Muscovy, which would eventually 
become the Russian empire, was invaded by outside forces including Poles and Lithuanians, 
and seized neighboring territory in its own invasions. 
 The colonialization of Russia by outside forces and of neighboring areas by Russian 
forces is enshrined, and even celebrated, in Russian history.  Russian historian Vasily 
Klyuchevsky (1841-1911) wrote The Course of Russian History as a five-volume work that 
                                                          
3
 Glenn E. Curtis, “Kievan Rus’ and Mongol Periods,” excerpted from Russia: A Country 




identified colonization as the “greatest influence in Russian history.”
4
  In it he wrote, “the 
history of Russia is a history of a country that colonizes.  The territory of colonization 
expanded along with its state borders.  With rises and falls, this ancient motion continues all 
the way unto our days.”
5
  Michael Khodarkovsky, a Professor of History at Loyola who 
focuses on the Russian Empire, writes in his book Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a 
Colonial Empire, 1500-1800 that Russia’s expansion was a “deliberate process with varying 
motives and policies… but consistent in its objectives of expansion and colonization of the 
new regions and peoples.”
6
  It is important to note that during this period multiple empires 
throughout the world  sought control of increasingly large territories.  But the important 





 centuries.     
Pre-World War I 
 In the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century Russia sought to take territory from the Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian Empires via both subterfuge and direct military intervention.  The 
expansion was based on multiple premises, including the protection of ethnic Slavs in the 
Ottoman Empire by taking control of those regions and acquiring Istanbul – formerly  
Constantinople – which had been the center of Eastern Orthodoxy and thus the most holy site 
                                                          
4
 Olga Prodan, “Prominent Russians: Vasily Klyuchevsky,” RT Russiapedia, accessed 
January 12, 2016, http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/education/vasily-
klyuchevsky/.  Excerpt of The Course of Russian History was accessed via this site because I 




 Michael Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500-
1800 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 2. 
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of Russia’s religious heritage.
7
   Additionally, gaining control of Constantinople and parts of 
the Ottoman Empire would ensure Russian control of the Turkish Straits, which includes the 
Bosporus Straits, between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.  The Black Sea holds one of 
only two warm water western Russian port on the Crimean Peninsula, leaving Russian naval 
vessels’ ability to quickly access the Mediterranean and the Atlantic year round at the mercy 
of the Ottomans.    
 By the late 19
th
 century German and Russian neutrality agreements had fallen apart.  
In the early 20
th
 century, two conflicting alliances were formed featuring the Allies of 
Britain, France, and Russia on one side and the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-
Hungary, and Italy on the other.  As Slav nationalist movements grew in the early 20
th
 
century the Central Powers became increasingly disgruntled with Russian intervention in the 
region.  Russians, perceiving Austrians as aggressors and the Germans as their backers in the 
Balkans, began calling for a more aggressive policy to defend ethnic Slavs.  By 1914 
tensions began to bubble over as Russians in positions of power, including the Tsar, began to 
entertain the possibility of a war to defend the Slavs in the Balkans.
8
  Immediately following 
the Central Powers’ declaration of war against Serbia on July 28, 1914 Russia began 
mobilizing its military based on a belief that a German declaration of war was imminent.  On 
August 1, 1914 Germany declared war on Russia and by November 1914 the Central Powers 
were joined by Turkey (although Italy remained neutral and eventually joined the Allies) and 
the Allies, joined by Serbia and Japan, were involved in a war that continued through 1918 
and created a very altered landscape in the region.   
                                                          
7
 Orlando Figes, Revolutionary Russia: 1891 – 1991 (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014), 
51 
8
 Ibid, 52. 
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World War I Through World War II 
 Russian involvement in the war created food shortages, and an already present 
dissatisfaction with the Tsar rapidly grew.  The February Revolution in 1917 ultimately 
overthrew the Romanov dynasty and replaced the monarchy with a Provisional Government.  
The Provisional Government enacted reforms that Vladimir Lenin proclaimed made Russia 
the “the freest of all belligerent countries in the world,”
9
 including freedom of assembly, 
press, and speech, and removing legal restrictions on religion, race, and gender.  The 
response from many of the non-Russian satellites that fell under the empire was one of 
celebration, with citizens believing they had now gained independence at the most and 
autonomy at the least, and raising national flags in place of symbols of the monarchy.  The 
reality though was that Russia was unwilling to grant independence to most of the 
nationalists with the exception of Central-Powers-occupied Poland.  In October 1917 a 
second revolution led by the Bolsheviks resulted in a coup d’état against the Provisional 
Government with Lenin becoming the leader of Russia.  On March 3, 1918 the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk was signed with Russia giving up most of its territories in Eastern Europe, 
including Poland, Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania, to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and 
withdrew troops from Ukraine.  In 1918 a Civil War broke out between the anti-Bolshevik 
Whites and the Bolshevik Red Army that ultimately led to the defeat of the Whites and the 
creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.   
 The USSR initially included Russia, Ukraine, Transcaucasia (South Caucasus nations 
of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan), and Belarus; these would ultimately be the first of 
                                                          
9
 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution,” Pravda no. 




many moves made by Russia to expand its empire back into Europe and retake Slavic nations 
Russia believed to be theirs.   The expansion was enshrined in Soviet symbology put in place 
by the revolutionaries in 1918 and propagated through various policies.  The red star, worn 
on the caps of soldiers, symbolized the fight for light and justice, the five points were said to 
represent the five continents that the Bolshevik’s “revolutionary struggle would one day 
liberate from exploiters.”
10
  Lenin realized the importance of conquering outside nations who 
had more resources available to the ultimate success of socialism.  Russian leadership 
attempted to accomplish these goals through the previously mentioned subterfuge and 
meddling in the affairs of neighboring nations.  While trade and increased diplomacy would 
be outwardly attempted, provocateurs would promote communist movements in the target 
countries.  These deceptive policies would ultimately become some of the stalwarts of Soviet 
strategy. 
 In 1924 Joseph Stalin rose to power in the Soviet Union, ushering in a new era of 
relations between Russia and its Soviet member-states.  By the early 1930s Stalin’s Soviet 
Union was suffering a significant food shortage because of resistance by relatively affluent 
peasant farmers known as Kulaks who had been forced into collective farms in order to 
support Stalin’s larger industrialization efforts.  Stalin turned to Ukraine to solve the food 
shortage problem.  The seizure of grain from Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 came to be known 
as Holodomor, which translates to “death by hunger.”  The issue was exacerbated by Stalin’s 
decision to prevent citizens from leaving the area struck by famine and deporting and 
murdering many others.  The number of Ukrainians murdered by Stalin and his policies has 
been placed in the range of five to seven million.  Stalin also targeted Poles, Chechens, 
                                                          
10
 Figes, Revolutionary Russia: 1891 – 1991, 204. 
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Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Romanians, Crimean Tartars and Greeks, Ingush, Koreans 
and many others for resettlement that often resulted in death.  Even his own countrymen and 
party members were not spared because Stalin regarded them as a threat to his leadership and 
the direction of the nation.  During The Great Terror Stalin not only imprisoned upwards of 
one million of his own countrymen, but conducted large-scale executions of perceived 
adversaries that current estimates place at a minimum of 30 million. 
 The German invasion of the USSR in June 1941, despite its cataclysmic impact on 
Russia, ultimately turned the tide of the European Theater of World War II in the Grand 
Coalition’s favor and actually gave the USSR an advantage in executing Stalin’s policy.  
After defeating the Germans in conjunction with the Allies in May 1945, Stalin, realizing the 
opportunity the war gave him, turned his attention back to Eastern Europe.  His plan was to 
exploit the damage done by the Nazis by “liberating” those nations and then installing 
Communist leadership.  The success of the plan hinged on his ability to remain relevant to 
seeing through the Allied mission in Europe and the Pacific, and on keeping Allied nations in 
the dark about his goals while he “liberated” formerly Axis-controlled nations.  He gave 
interviews denouncing any desire or intent to subvert other nations, he ordered foreign 
Communists to disguise their true intent by participating in anti-fascist and nationalist 
groups, and he prepared his Communist leaders who would take over the various targeted 
nations.  While Stalin demanded control of some nations, he merely subverted or invaded the 
remainder, putting pro-Soviet leadership in power and imprisoning or executing anyone 





The Cold War 
 Stalin changed the global security landscape for decades in the aftermath of World 
War II, claiming nations from the Baltics down through Eastern and Central Europe, into the 
Balkans and over to the Caucasus and Central Asia, as new Soviet member states.  A large 
part of this strategy was Stalinization and Russification.  Stalinization involved the 
indoctrination of each Soviet satellite state into a political system based rigidly on the Soviet 
system established by Stalin and ruled by ‘Little Stalins’.  Russification was the total 
indoctrination of every schoolchild into the Russian culture on the basis of the superiority of 
Russia over any other European culture.  This included knowing the Russian language as a 
requirement for work and higher education; learning Russian history and literature; and 
immersion in Russian music, dance, food, and drink.   
 Expansion continued throughout the Cold War with varying degrees of success.  
Ultimately, the communist nations aligned to varying degrees with the USSR would include 
China, Vietnam, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, and North Korea.  Soviet leadership would also 
seek to establish an influence in various other nations, including Syria, through aid and 
military programs.   
 By the late 1970’s USSR member states and other nations in the Soviet sphere were 
experiencing a changing landscape.
11
  In Soviet Central Asia the population in general had 
increased, including a 25% jump in the Muslim population; in Europe the minority nationals 
were also beginning to create problems for the Soviet machine.  The ongoing arms race and 
the failure in Afghanistan further accelerated the move toward collapse.  In the late 1980s the 
                                                          
11




first communist regimes began to collapse.  The regimes in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania all had fallen by 1989, and others would begin to 
seek independence in the 1990s. In January 1991 Soviet troops attacked government, radio, 
and television offices in Lithuania and Latvia in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to stop 
the drive for independence that was being taken up by other Soviet states.  On December 25, 
1991 the Soviet flag was lowered and the Russian flag raised in its place. On December 
31,1991 the Soviet Union officially ended.  
History of Russia, Ukraine, and Crimea 
 The area occupied by Ukraine came under the control of Kievan Rus, whose capital 
was the city of Kyiv.  Following the collapse of Kievan Rus the western half of Ukraine was 
controlled by Lithuanians and then Poles while Cossacks controlled the eastern portion.  It 
was during this time that the differing identities of Russians and Ukrainians that colors 
relations in the present day became strongly defined.
12
  In the late 17
th
 century Russia began 
the process of drawing eastern Ukraine back under their control (including the Crimean 
peninsula in the late 18
th
 century) although they failed to absorb the entirety of Ukraine back 
into their realm of influence until after World War I.  In this interim period of “Two 
Ukraines” western Ukraine began developing an ethnic identity.  In 1917 Crimea became a 
sovereign state only to be retaken in 1921 by the USSR to become the Crimean Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic.  In 1919 the Bolsheviks, who had seized the entirety of Ukraine, 
created the Ukranian Soviet Republic, and in 1922 the Ukrainian Soviet Republic became a 
member of the USSR.  In 1954 Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made the decision to 
                                                          
12
 Serhy Yekelchyk, “The Ukrainian Crisis: In Russia’s Long Shadow,” Origins: Current 




transfer Crimea from a status as their own Soviet Socialist Republic to Ukraine.  This was an 
economically sound decision because of strong economic links between Crimea and Ukraine 
based on the geography of the two nations.  However, the two nations had never previously 
had any cultural or ethnic ties to one another: Ukrainians are considered ethnic Slavs and the 
Crimeans prior to their purge by Stalin in 1944 were ethnic Tartars.  The decision to attach 
Crimea to Ukraine in 1954 remained after the fall of the USSR, creating a country for which 
no historic precedent existed.   
Post-Cold War 
 December 1991 ushered in a new era on the European continent that many thought 
would include a shift to democracy for the Eastern Bloc and an improved security situation.  
Former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations would have representative governments, open 
markets, and open dialogue; concerns about an outbreak of war or the use of nuclear weapons 
would be put to rest.  For some nations, these hopes became reality; seven former Warsaw 
Pact nations are now European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
member nations with an eighth, Albania, currently a NATO member and an EU candidate 
nation.  In contrast, former Soviet states have experienced more challenges with their shift.  
Of the 15, only Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have integrated into the EU and NATO. 
Others have expressed interest in joining either organization, or both, but have ultimately 
moved away from those alliances for a variety of reasons.  For some nations the issue has 
been that the governments are still largely autocratic and exercise significant control over the 
populace. For others who have sought increased democracy the issue has been a Russia that 
still actively meddles in the affairs of its former member states.   Former Warsaw Pact 
nations and the Baltic States, protected in part by NATO, have been interfered with primarily 
18 
 
through propaganda meant to appeal to the “plight”of ethnic Russians who are “subjugated” 
by the national governments.  However, former Soviet nations have been subject to much 
more aggressive tactics by Russia.  
 In 2008 Russian forces invaded Georgia after a scuffle between South Ossetian 
separatists and Georgian Peacekeepers resulted in the commitment of Georgian forces.  The 
Russian invasion force was reinforced by land, naval, and air elements and may have been 
spearheaded by a [alleged] Russian cyberattack.
13
  In the years that followed Russia became 
even more involved in the affairs of their former Soviet and Warsaw Pact neighbors, 
culminating in the recent takeover of Crimea and commitment of forces to the Donetks River 
Basin region of eastern Ukraine. At the helm of the Russian state in this increasingly 
aggressive period has been the former KGB agent-turn-president, Vladimir Putin.  
The Leadership of Vladimir Putin 
 Vladimir Putin was born in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) in 1952, and grew up in a 
working-class family.  He graduated with a law degree from Leningrad State University in 
1975 and immediately joined the KGB where he served at posts in the Soviet Union and East 
Germany.  In the late 1980s Putin returned to his Alma Mater under the auspices of faculty, 
but actually as an in-house KGB officer responsible for recruiting and spying on students.  
Shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putin quit the KGB at the rank of lieutenant 
colonel to work in the government of an old professor who would usher St. Petersburg into 
the post-Soviet era.  In 1996 Putin moved to Moscow and joined the Kremlin staff, ultimately 
becoming the director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB’s post-Soviet 
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successor, and the head of the Kremlin Security Council in 1998.  In August 1999 President 
Boris Yelstin tapped Putin for the position as prime minister; a move some believe had been 
promoted by Yelstin’s inner circle and others who were attempting to secure a successor.
14
  
Yelstin’s abrupt resignation in December 1999 resulted in Putin’s ascendance to the 
presidency; his election in March 2000 secured him a position of growing power in Russia to 
this day. 
 In March 2000 Putin became the president of Russia, receiving 74 percent of the vote 
in what observers considered a democratic election with 75 percent voter turnout.
15
  He was 
reelected in 2004, and succeeded by Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 following the end of Putin’s 
second four year term - a constitutional limit placed on the office of the president in Russia.  
Immediately following his election, Medvedev appointed Putin to the role of Prime 
Minister.
16
  Although the people of Russia had chosen Medvedev as their president, Putin 
was still very much the power broker and viewed by many as being in charge.  In late 2011 
Medvedev announced he would not seek a second term and recommended Putin for the 
position of president – a position that had recently changed from four years to six years in 
duration under a constitutional amendment.  Putin in turn said he would appoint Medvedev 
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as his prime minister.  Putin won reelection in 2012 with 64.7 percent of the vote,
17
 though 
many viewed it as a fixed election whose result had been determined prior to Putin’s 
candidacy announcement.
18
  Because of the new six-year presidential term , it would not be 
unreasonable to anticipate a Russia with Putin at the helm until 2024.   
 The history of Russia is significant to its culture, the world view of its citizens and 
leaders, and its larger strategy.  The challenges faced by early Russians, including consistent 
exterior threats, shaped their early interactions and forced them to find ways to more 
effectively protect their borders.  This desire mixed with a perspective of Russians as 
superior, coloring their interactions with neighbors and outside nations.  This Russian 
preeminence carries across generations, from Lenin to Stalin to Putin, and many leaders in 
between, as Russia has sought to continually expand their empire and draw those around 
them into their sphere of influence.  At times Russia has utilized military power to achieve 
this goal.  However, they have also proven adept at wielding other elements of power to exert 
influence and achieve national aims.  In times when the military was weak or would be 
ineffective against a foe, economic power has become the tool of choice.  Additionally, 
Russia has placed propaganda and manipulation as a central strategy, using it to overtake 
adversaries or goad them into taking action to which a response would be justifiable and 
open a door to achieving their larger aims.  Ultimately though, all of this goes back to a main 
theme, Russia’s long history of desiring to be and working towards the aim of super power.  
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Someone with whom the other major international players must contend, someone who must 
be at the table in resovling all major matters.    
22 
 
RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE & STRATEGY 
“The collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”  
Vladimir Putin (Russian President) 
  
 Russian stratetgic culture and strategy are heavily informed by Russia’s history, 
geography, and geopolitical interests.  It has been described as “one of the most martial and 
militarized cultures in history, rivaling, if not exceeding, those of Prussian Imperial and Nazi 
Germany, and Imperial Japan in this respect.”
19
  The militarized nature of the strategic 
culture, notably the government institutions more than the general populace, is a result of the 
status of Russia as a conquered nation in the earliest periods of nationhood and the move to 
the role of conqueror for the remainder of their experience.  Their rise to superpower status in 
the wake of World War II and their national and economic collapse at the end of 1991 
hardened the resolve of the current leadership to strengthen Russia’s standing and return to 
their previous greatness.   
 These aspirations are best accomplished through a focused strategy featuring 
significant components easily categorized into the American concept of DIME – diplomatic, 
information, military, and economic – with a decidedly Russian twist.  In the Russian model, 
military, information and diplomatic components of national power are intertwined to make 
one almost indistinguishable from another.  Economic power is also used as a foreign policy 
tool to manipulate adversaries and accomplish goals.  This strategic culture and the resultant 
strategy come together to inform their interaction with neighboring nations, resulting in a 
more aggressive stance than considered appropriate based on global norms and mores.   
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 Russian strategic culture is informed by the early periods discussed in the previous 
chapter.  Early on, their “physical and ethnographic geography” and a lack of “established 
and defensible borders” made them vulnerable to neighboring empires.
20
   This consistent 
external threat from invading empires to the west, south, and east forced Russian leaders to 
develop a strong military capable of defending their interests.  Additionally, an increasing 
desire to ascend to the ranks of the great European empires inspired Russian leaders to take 
on their own imperialistic strategy.  The consistent exterior threats, an early move toward 
imperialism, and a large population capable of providing much-needed manpower to the 
defense establishment has ingrained national militarization into Russian strategic culture.  
This allowed for increasing expansionism that saw Russia draw in surrounding regions that 
gave Russia – a nation lacking natural barriers to invasion – a buffer against those seeking to 
conquer it.  The expansion also provided Russia, a nation lacking a warm water port with 
ready access to the Mediterranean, access to the port of Sevastopl on the Crimean peninsula 
in the Black Sea.  
 A Russian perception of ethnic and nationalist exceptionalism over neighboring 
ethnic and religious groups further encourages the expansion of Russian influence into these 
areas.  The Russian institution views Russian and Slavic values and security as superior to 
the values and security of their neighbors and former Soviet member nations.  This has been 
evidenced throughout history as Russia seized these nations and used their resources and 
manpower to prop up the Russian state through the present day as Russia seeks to continue to 
influence events in neighboring nations.  In more recent cases, these countries and their 
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citizens have been subjected to Russian interference in national politics and economics.  In 
the older cases, which were decidedly more extreme, entire crops were seized resulting in a 
deadly famine for whole ethnic groups (especially Ukrainians) while other minority groups 
were subjected to a calculated campaign of relocation and even in some cases extermination.   
 In the period prior to World War II (WWII) Russians faced a new threat that they 
perceived as being dangerous to their culture and well being along with their recently 
adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology.  The new threat was capitalism and Western influence, 
which resulted in a newly developed component to Russian strategic culture.  This aversion 
to Western influence has been a central Russian focus for the better part of the last century 
and has influenced various strategic steps and policies during WWII, the Cold War, and the 
present day.  Russia perceives itself as an ethnically and nationally superior entity that should 
wield significant influence over regional and global interests. Russia also views sovereignty 
as a “fundamental organizing principle of the international system” and its leaders are 
“opposed to everything that can undermine the nation state.”
21
  This mindset has put them at 
odds with the influence wielded by the United States (US), European Union (EU), and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), causing both the Cold War and a recent uptick in 
tensions. As more former Soviet and Warsaw Pact member nations continue to move toward 
the West this aversion could become even more pronounced and further increase tensions 
with the West.  
 Russia views itself as deserving a place on the international stage, similar to the 
power they wielded towards the end of and after WWII.  They believe their superpower 
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status should be comparable to the influence held by Western nations, including the US.  
They view themselves as “indispensable in solving key contemporary security problems” and 
believe they should have a role in the “implementation of the international agenda, as well as 
in its development.”
22
  This belief has manifested itself in Russian action in Georgia, Crimea, 
and Ukraine, where Russia made itself the central component for the “solution”  of issues 
they had themselves created.  In Syria they are ensuring they play a central role in any 
solution to the civil war and the issue of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).   
Russian Military Strategy 
 Russian military strategy has always been used to cement Russian power in regions 
they wish to control or whose desires for independence need to be suppressed.  Toward the 
end of WWII Russia used the collapse of Germany and military power to “free” many 
nations under Germany’s power and then impose Russian political will onto them, resulting 
in the establishment of many Soviet and Warsaw Pact member states.  Some nations that had 
not been “freed” from German rule were simply invaded by Russian forces and forced into 
the Soviet sphere against their will.  In the post-Cold War period Russia used military power 
against Chechnya, a Russian Republic, twice, in order to suppress a push for independence 
and in response to Chechen separatist attacks on Russian targets.  It is in the Chechen 
example that Russia best shows their willingness to use their military power to 
indiscrimantely target civilians.  Representatives from Human Rights Watch have testified to 
the Russian campaign that included carpet bombing, artillery including surface to surface 
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rockets, and the siege and destructions of many cities and towns causing widespread human 
atrocities for the civilians who were able to survive.
23
   
 In recent years Russian military strategy has mostly, though not entirely, eased up on 
conventional tactics.  Instead, they have focused on what many perceive as an attempt to 
counter Western influence and draw countries previously under Soviet influence back into 
the Russian sphere of influence.  Some have even pointed out that the tactics are a return to 
Cold War methods.
24
  Russia’s assertion in its 2016 national security strategy that NATO 
expansion toward Russian borders poses a threat to Russian security seems to strengthen the 
idea that Russian leaders view Western action as a threat that must be countered.
25
   These 
realities have resulted in a consistent uptick in Russian military spending, even when the 
economy is struggling.    
 According to the World Bank, Russian military expenditure as a percentage of its 
GDP reached 4.5 percent in 2014, the highest it has been since 1994 when the number was 
4.9 percent.
26
  The current estimates by journalists place the 2015 military expenditures 
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around 4.3 percent of GDP,
 27
 though the World Bank has yet to release the figures.  When 
looking at dollar amounts, Russian military spending in 2014 reached $3.25 trillion rubles (or 
almost $42.2 billion USD based on current exchange rates)
28
 and increased to $54.1 billion 
USD in 2015.
29
  This is a significant increase from the 1992 amounts of $904 million rubles, 
or roughly $12.58 million USD.  The increased GDP has allowed Russia to rebuild their 
military and expand operations.   
 Under Putin, Russia has undertaken military operations in Chechnya, Georgia, and 
Ukraine.  Russia has also provided military aid in the form of manpower and artillery pieces 
and Russian indirect fire to separatist forces in Ukraine fighting the government in their civil 
war as well as material and physical support to Bashar al Assad in Syria based on the premise 
of targeting ISIS.  Beginning in 2007, the military has returned to Cold War-style bomber 
runs along Western nations’ borders and Putin proclaimed that they could afford round the 
clock operations by their nuclear bombers.
30
  More recently they have participated in 
aggressive maneuvers targeting Western aircraft and have been accused of violating several 
nations’ territorial waters utilizing submarines.  As the Russian military expands its 
operations, it is not unreasonable to see an attempted expansion of access to foreign military 
facilities.  The takeover of Crimea gave Russia ownership of Sevastopol, a naval base 
previously leased from Ukraine that is home to their Black Sea Fleet and is a valuable warm 
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water port with access to the Mediterranean.  Actions in Syria also ensure that Russia 
maintains access to its naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus, which is small yet significant 
because it prevents Russian forces from being blockaded in the Bosporus Strait by Turkey.   
Russian Information Warfare Strategy 
 Information warfare has become central to Russian strategy with U.S. leaders 
accusing Russia of “waging ‘the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever 
seen in the history of information warfare’.”
31
  Russians themselves have also affirmed their 
stance on information warfare by identifying it as one of the key components of their 2016 
national security strategy.
32
  While there are many components and manifestations of 
information warfare, the primary goal is simple: use propaganda, distortion, subversion, and 
every other information tactic, no matter how seemingly laughable, to turn Russian strategy 
into reality.  Russia has used the expected tactics of state owned media, which will be 
referenced when relevant in this and other chapters to explain the Russian perspective,  but 
has also taken advantage of social media to spread its message.   
 The concept of maskirovka is the primary component of Russian information warfare 
and is central to the Russian strategy and mindset.  The term itself refers to “camouflage, 
concealment, deception, imitation, disinformation, secrecy, security, feints, diversions, and 
simulation” and has incredibly broad applications.
33
  It is said to date back to the Battle of 
Kulikovo Field in 1320 when Dmitri Ivanovich divided his fighters into two groups, those 
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mounted in an open field to draw the Mongols into attack and those hiding in the forest to 
ambush the Mongol forces attacking the soldiers in the field.  The tactic has been used in 
nearly every Russian military advancement, including to conceal the development of 
weapons, and every application of Russian power and influence; maskirovka is ingrained in 
Russian operations and strategy.
34
   
 The deception has been integrated into Soviet planning and operations on multiple 
occasions.  It has also been integrated into military operations, diplomatic efforts, 
information operations, and economic strategy.  Sometimes it has been a great undertaking, 
including the ongoing Russian denial of involvement in the downing of Malaysian Airlines 
flight 17 over Ukraine.
35
  Russian media, particularly the outlet formerly known as Russia 
Today but now simply known as RT,
36
 have repeated Kremlin claims that neither Russia nor 
Ukrainian separatists are responsible for shooting down the plane.  They claim Ukraine, not 
Russia, owns the weapons system in question, that they possess radar data placing culpability 
on a Ukrainan fighter, that it was actually an air to air missile instead of a Buk surface to air 
missile (SAM), and that a SAM could not have shot down the plane from separatist contolled 
Ukraine.
37
  At other times, it has been a simpler process of sending Russian troops into 
Crimea without insignia on their uniforms and then vehemently denying that they are 
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  In the most simplistic of applications, maskirovka has involved the application of 
a mask covering the face of the Russian provocateur and the utter shock that anyone would 
question the wearer’s identity and the purpose of their mask.
39
 
 Early in the conflict in Ukraine Joergen Moeller, a Danish geopolitical scholar, 
accurately predicted the trajectory of Russian action aimed at Ukraine, specifically the 
implementation of maskirovka.  He identified the utilization of a Russian propaganda 
campaign to justify the annexation of Crimea, and the likely use of manufactured unrest in 
eastern and southern Ukraine through the insertion of troops disguised as militia as grounds 
to declare Russia as the protector of minority Russians in Ukraine.
40
  Russia also used the 
guise of non-Red Cross approved aid convoys and Ukrainian aggression toward minority 
Russians as justification for their involvement.  These actions solidify their position as 
liberators amongst their allies, shine a negative light on the actions of their adversaries, and 
create a propaganda machine painting themselves as the “good guys.” 
 Russian strategy has included significant amounts of measured subversion in former 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations since the dissolution of the USSR.  This dissatisfaction with 
their former allies is highlighted in the national security strategy for 2016, which specifically 
identifies “‘color revolutions’” and the “‘radical social groups which use nationalist and 
religious extremist ideologies, foreign and international NGOs, and also private citizens’ who 
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work to undermine Russia’s territorial integrity and destabilized political processes” as some 
of the  key threats to national security.
41
  Russia has already enacted measures to address 
these security concerns, including propping up Russian backed regimes in former Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact countries and enacting legislation meant to punish those who choose to push 
back.   
 In nations aligned with EU and NATO where Russia must act more cautiously to 
avoid further confrontations, the preferred course of action seems to be subversion.  Russian 
President Vladimir Putin has declared on numerous occasions that Russia reserves the right 
to defend the interests and rights of ethnic Russians abroad.
42
  This policy has served as the 
basis for intervention in Georgia, Crimea, and eastern Ukraine when the Russians finally 
admitted to their involvement. These campaigns have been based heavily on the concept of 
maskirovka. Russia used a puppet president to move Ukraine away from the EU and NATO 
and toward the Russian orbit, causing protests.  Then, they “sowed chaos” in Ukraine by 
inserting Russian forces dressed as separatists and provide military weapons to the actual 
separatists, held “elections” in Crimea, and toyed with the national economy.
43
  World 
leaders have expressed concern over similarly styled campaigns of subversion occurring in 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,
44
 as have Polish leaders.
45
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Russian Economic Strategy 
 Russian strategy utilizes economic power in the form of their energy market to exert 
pressure on neighboring nations.  Putin has declared that Russia’s energy market will 
establish the nation as a “‘great energy power,’ even an energy superpower,” and has clearly 
indicated through his actions that the nation will monopolize every aspect of the industry 
from extraction to distribution and marketing.
46
  Russia has, on multiple occasions, utilized 
the availability of gas to the European continent to influence events in the region, usually as 
they relate to Ukrainian relations since the pipelines pass through Ukraine.  The manipulation 
of available gas to the region has been ongoing since the 1990s and tends to occur in the 
winter.  It is perceived as punishment for the West for drawing in former Russian allies, and 
Ukraine for seeking strengthened partnerships with Western nations and organizations.  As 
tensions between Russia and Ukraine have increased so has the utilization of natural gas as a 
leverage for Russia against the West and Ukraine, and more recently to punish Ukrainians for 
removing Russian-backed president Viktor Yanukovych from power.
47
   
Russian Foreign Policy Strategy 
 In addition to military and economic pressure and the more subtle campaigns of 
subversion undertaken by the Russian state, Russian foreign policy has begun establishing 
more overt methods of influencing neighboring nations.  The two most significant strategies 
have been the establishment of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization 
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(CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).  Both of these organizations are 
comprised of and have courted former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations and their allies, 
including Ukraine.  In fact, Russian pressure on Ukraine to join the EEU was believed to be a 
contributor to the decision in 2013 to end the Ukrainian alignment with the EU.  This led 
directly to the Orange Revolution, Ukraine’s turn back toward Europe, and Russia’s 
subsequent intervention in separatist provinces in the Donetks River Basin region of eastern 
Ukraine.  
 The CSTO was founded in 1992 and is meant to be the Russian response to NATO.  
It originally included Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgzstan, Tajikstan, and Uzbekistan.  However, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan have 
all departed the organization.  In reality, the organization is largely ineffective and primarily 
serves as a method for Russia to control former allies and maintain access to military bases in 
the region.  The EEU treaty was signed in May 2014 and includes Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgzstan.  Similar to the CSTO, the EEU is Russia’s response to the EU 
and is meant to strengthen the economic positions of the involved countries, particularly 
Russia.   The EEU allows a more effective method for establishing trade relations with other 
nations, and would have benefitted greatly from diversification provided by the Ukrainian 
economy. 
 Russian strategy is built of many traditional components, diplomacy, military 
engagement, economic influence, and information management.  Like many nations, they 
draw these elements together when implementing strategic goals.  Unlike other nations that 
are mostly or fully developed, Russia takes an underhanded and highly aggressive approach 
to its strategy.  The level of subversion that Russian leaders are willing to undertake to 
34 
 
achieve strategic goals is not considered acceptable by international standards, and the 
decision to invade Ukraine and annex Crimea runs totally contrary to the laws governing 
invasion of sovereign nations.  Both Ukraine and Syria provide excellent examples of 




POST-COLD WAR INTERVENTIONISM  
“It is alarming that military intervention in internal conflicts in foreign countries has become 
commonplace for the United States.”            









centuries than it has in Europe.  Europe, particularly in the aftermath of World War II 
(WWII), opened the door for Russia to rise to its long-sought status of global superpower.  
The United States (US) and its European allies posed the single most significant threat to 
Russia’s power and influence during the Cold War.  After a 45-year struggle, the US, 
supported by its European and other allies, brought about the collapse of Russia’s empire in 
1991.  The Europeans then encroached upon the fragments of that empire by expanding 
through the European Union (EU) and with the U.S. through the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).  The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were 
economically, militarily, and strategically devastating for Russian leaders; and the rapid 
altering of the European landscape in the post-Cold War period was a painful and constant 
reminder of that.  Thus it makes sense that as Russia’s military strengthens and its economy 
surges in a way not seen in decades, Russia would seek to reassert itself in what it views as 
territory stolen from it by the West.   
The Post-Cold War European Landscape 
 The end of the Cold War significantly altered the geography of Europe in both the 
short and long term.  These alterations included the dissolution of four nations and the 
creation or independence of fourteen. The changes also opened doors to the inclusion of 
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many former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations in both the EU and NATO.  Some of these 
former Eastern Bloc states, particularly Warsaw Pact countries and the Baltic States were 
quick to alter the political landscapes of their countries to fit their own wants and needs, in 
most cases moving pointedly toward democracy.  Citizens in other nations also sought, and at 
times protested for, these democratic shifts in the post-Cold War period.  The success of the 
former Eastern Bloc nations has varied widely and resulted in tense stand-offs between 
citizens, elected officials, and Russian entities.   
 The end of the Cold War was caused by many factors; economic decline, last Soviet 
President Mikhail Gorbachev’s policies of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost 
(openness), and discontent among citizens in member nations who began to push back 
against the Russian leadership.  The initial changes included East Germany’s collapse and 
immediate integration with West Germany on October 3, 1990.  The reunification of 
Germany resulted in former East Germany’s automatic acceptance into both the EU and 
NATO, the first of many former Eastern Bloc nations to join the ranks of these traditionally 
Western organizations.  In 1991 the collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed that state and 
created fifteen new ones, including Russia.  Of these, eight were in Eurasia and six – Belarus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine – were in Europe. Finally, in 1993 
Czechoslovakia divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  Yugoslavia, a communist 
nation that chose to not align with either the Warsaw Pact or the West during the Cold War 
also began breaking apart in 1991 and ultimately comprised six states and the disputed 
territory of Kosovo in Serbia.   
 The inclusion of former Warsaw Pact nations – Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia 
(now the Czech Republic and Slovakia), East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania – 
37 
 
into NATO and the EU began a decade prior to the inclusion of any former Soviet States. 
The first expansion occurred in 1999 with NATO accepting the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland.  In 2004 NATO and EU saw the largest combined expansion.  NATO expanded 
to include the former Warsaw Pact nations of Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia.  The EU also 
began accepting former Warsaw Pact nations in 2004, allowing entrance to the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia.  Additionally, 2004 saw the first, and so far only, 
former Soviet States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania join both NATO and the EU.  In 2007 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU, and in 2009 Albania became a NATO member nation.  
Currently the only former Eastern Bloc nation that is a candidate for membership to the EU is 
Albania.  Moldova has also sought closer ties with the EU, signing an association agreement 
in June 2014.   
 In the past both Georgia and Ukraine have sought membership to either NATO or the 
EU.  Georgia had become a Partnership for Peace member nation of NATO, but the issue of 
its geographic distance from Europe and conflict with Russia stopped its full membership in 
NATO.  Ukraine has not yet sought membership in NATO, although recent polling indicates 
that 64% of Ukrainian respondents would support joining the alliance and political shifts in 
Ukraine indicate a desire to join NATO.
49
  In 2013 Ukraine, under then President Viktor 
Yanukovych, seemed poised to sign an association agreement with the EU.  In November of 
2013 Yanukovych chose instead to move away from the EU and strengthen ties with Russia, 
sparking protests in the capital.  He fled Ukraine for Russia in February 2014 as a result of 
the situation, and in June 2014 the agreement was signed between current President Petro 
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Poroshenko and the EU.  This association agreement allows for the possibility of Ukraine 
becoming a candidate nation should they meet certain thresholds for candidacy, though it is 
not currently an EU candidate.  Georgia is also not currently an EU candidate, though the EU 
does consider Georgia a European country, which could open the door to expansion.   
 A final component in the changing European landscape in the post-Cold War period 
has been the occurrence of Color Revolutions from 2003 to 2005 in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Ukraine.  These revolutions were considered electoral in that the protestors demanded 
that their leadership not steal elections, that they accept the candidates elected by the 
populace, and that they transfer power to the democratically elected candidates.
50
  Ukraine 
and Georgia saw some short-term advantages of the revolutions, but true reform never fully 
took hold.  In recent years both nations have tried to correct their political systems, but 
democratic institutions still struggle in those nations.  Ultimately, the revolutions have had 
largely the opposite effect, with the leadership in many former Soviet states that never 
experienced their own Color Revolutions, including Russia, enacting laws meant to prevent 
future Color Revolutions.   In fact, Putin has gone so far as to say that Moscow must prevent 
a Color Revolution in the country, stating: “in the modern world extremism is being used as a 
geopolitical instrument and for remaking spheres of influence. We see what tragic 
consequences the wave of so-called color revolutions led to… for us this is a lesson and a 
warning.  We should do everything necessary so that nothing similar ever happens in 
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  This statement indicates the perspective of Russian leadership on the impact of 
Color Revolutions on their own sphere of influence, and provides an interesting lens through 
which to view events in Georgia in 2008, and more recent events in Eastern Europe in 
general, and within Ukraine and Crimea in particular.     
Georgia as an Indicator 
 On the surface, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia seems moderately justifiable.  
Georgia had denied independence to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, breakaway provinces 
supported by Russia and occupied by Russian peacekeepers since 1992.  In 2008 Georgia 
fired the proverbial first shot when its military shelled the South Ossetian capital and sent 
troops into the province, reportedly killing South Ossetian citizens and Russian peacekeepers 
in the process.  The Russian response was an invasion meant to protect South Ossetian 
interests against Georgian aggression.  Most accounts of the invasion leave out many relevant 
facts and fail to account for the long and tense history between Georgia and Russia.  
 Georgia’s national identity can be traced back to the fourth and fifth centuries, but the 
country’s first significant historical interaction with Russia did not occur until a late 18
th
 
century treaty in which Russia guaranteed protection to Georgia against Persian invaders.  
This treaty allowed what has been described by the EU as “paving the way for further steps 
of Russian domination, both in terms of depth and space, finally leading to the complete 
integration of Georgia into the Russian Empire from 1881 until 1917.”
52
  Georgia became 
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independent once again from 1917-1921, when it was forced into the USSR, where it 
remained until declaring independence in April, 1991.  Almost immediately thereafter, 
conflict erupted in Georgia over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, both of which 
desired independence from Georgia and a close association with Russia.  The Russians took 
on the role of peacekeepers in 1993 in the region, ensuring a cease fire was maintained and 
acting in accordance with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMG).  This, 
along with numerous incidents and “unfriendly” and even “bellicose rhetoric” resulted in 
“continued deterioration” in relations between the two countries.
53
  One of the more 
significant issues was the decision by Russia in 2002 to undertake a “passportisation” [sic] 
policy.  This included the “mass conferral of Russian citizenship and consequently passports” 
to citizens of South Ossetia and Abkhaz, but it lacked any legal basis outside of Russia and 
could be considered a violation of Georgian sovereignty.
54
   
 In the months leading up to the 2008 invasion, tensions had been rapidly increasing.  
Georgian UAVs had been shot down by both Abkhaz and Russian forces.  Beginning in April 
of that year Russian forces reinforced troops already in the region, and naval forces were 
positioned in the Black Sea while troops were massed along the border for exercises.  In the 
summer there were bombings in Abkhazia, explosions in Georgia, subversive attacks 
between Georgia and South Ossetia, and the exchange of mortar and artillery fire between 
the two sides.  In early August South Ossetia began evacuating civilians to the Russian side 
of the border, and then on the night of August 7-8 Georgia began a heavy artillery 
bombardment of South Ossetia.  Georgia claims Russian forces were already in the country 
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when the operation began with a buildup having begun in July.  The Russians claim they did 
not commit forces until immediately following a decision by Russian leadership to intervene.  
On 10 August Georgia declared a unilateral ceasefire and announced the intention to 
withdraw troops from South Ossetia, a process that was almost completed by 11 August.  As 
Georgian forces retreated, Russian forces entered Georgian territory and occupied some 
towns.  Simultaneously, Russian and Abkhaz forces entered Georgia from the west and 
seized undefended Georgian territory.  The cease fire occurred on 12 August, but some 
Russian forces are reported to have remained in Georgia as late as October 2008.
55
 
 The EU fact-finding mission determined that initial Georgian hostilities were not 
justifiable under international law because they were neither justified, necessary, or 
proportional, particularly the use of heavy artillery to bombard a village.
56
  The EU also 
determined that elements of the South Ossetian, Russian, and Abkhaz response were not 
justifiable under international law, particularly the operations in Georgia, the involvement of 
naval forces, and any operations undertaken following the 12 August cease fire.
57
   
 Russian subversion began in Georgia almost immediately following Georgia’s 
independence from the Soviet Union, and experienced a notable increase in the 21
st
 century 
as Georgia attempted to align itself more closely with the West.  The EU fact-finding mission 
was never able to prove a movement of Russian forces in South Ossetia prior to the Georgian 
shelling on 7/8 August, although they did substantiate an abnormal, though not illegal, 
buildup of Russian military assets across the border.  This buildup, along with the 
introduction of air and naval combatant capabilities to the theater, dramatically increased 
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already high Georgian concerns regarding Russian intervention.  In addition to the build of 
Russian assets and equipment in the region, Russian authorities undertook multiple other 
measures that give the appearance of premeditation.  The counter-invasion began shortly 
after the Georgian shelling of South Ossetia, causing some to characterize the attack as 
“carefully planned and competently executed” and indicating that the Russians were 
expecting the attack.
58
  By 10 August Russian forces had launched an invasion from two 
points, bombed military airfields, disabled radars, and attacked numerous other targets, 
including civilian ones, in Georgia using both aircraft and naval bombardments.   
 More significant than the prepositioning of Russian forces was the “coordinated 
cyberspace domain attack” that began three weeks prior to the conventional war and was 
“synchronized with major combat actions” in three conventional domains.
59
  It has been 
pointed out that the cyber offensive was coordinated in Russian web sites, chat rooms, and 
various other networks and that a test run was conducted in July.
60
  When the ground attack 
was launched, Georgian websites used for communication, finance, and government were all 
taken offline by attacks, preventing citizens from accessing information and Georgian 
authorities from communicating effectively both inside and outside the country.
61
  The 
control of information in and exiting Georgia allowed Russian authorities to frame the issue 
in their own way, including the accusation that Georgia was conducting a genocide against 
the South Ossetians with 2,000 dead in the earliest periods of the conflict (the actual final 
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casualty numbers indicated a total of 850 people between all sides, 162 of whom were South 
Ossetian civilians).
62
   
 The components of the conflict between Russia and Georgia are both long and 
complicated, but they are incredibly telling of Russian strategy regarding protection of ethnic 
Russians and use of information warfare and maskirovka.  Additionally, they serve as a clear 
precursor to Russian subversion and intervention in Crimea and Ukraine five years later, with 
Marvin Kalb writing “the curtain actually rose on Putin’s intervention in Ukraine in the 
summer of 2008.”
63
  While the EU ruled that the Georgian justification for the initial attack 
was unfounded, the possibility that Russian leaders manipulated Georgian officials into 
attacking and giving Russia justification to launch a counter-invasion is not unreasonable.  In 
fact, Russian actions indicate that forcing a Georgian action that would justify a 
counterattack may have been the plan all along.  This probably served two purposes.  First, it 
allowed Russia to reassert itself militarily and remind the international community that it still 
wields power in the near abroad.
64
  Second, it allowed Russia to measure the willingness of 
the international community to respond to blatant disregard of international law and 
determine if NATO and the West would be willing to respond militarily, an action Putin 
properly assessed they would not take.
65
  Ultimately, the Russian action in Georgia was, as 
Kalb describes it, a test run for future military action in the near abroad. 
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Initial Involvement in Ukraine (November 2013) 
 As mentioned previously, Russian involvement in Ukraine goes back to the earliest 
period of Russian existence with the two nations’ histories intersecting at various points and 
periods of time.  Little Russia and Novorossiya (new Russia), as Ukraine has been called by 
Russian authorities, is considered by Kremlin leadership to be part of Russia.
66
  However, 
many people within and beyond Ukraine hold a different perspective.  They view Ukraine as 
having a distinct history, culture, and national identity.  This is not to say that Russian and 
Ukrainian history have not intersected; in fact they have intersected to the point that feelings 
about relations between the two nations are split.  In southern and eastern Ukrainian citizens 
identify more strongly with Russia, while in central and western Ukraine one finds 
nationalistic Ukrainians who prefer to align with the West.  Notably, the 2001 census found 
that only Crimea was majority ethnic Russian, while eastern and southern Ukraine were 50 
percent to 90 percent Ukrainian, and western and central Ukraine were comprised of 90 
percent to 100 percent ethnic Ukrainians.
67
  This makes it clear that, counter to Russian 
propaganda inextricably linking Ukraine to Russia, Ukraine is an independent nation with a 
history and culture that exists separate of Russia’s.  
 The state of relations between Russia and Ukraine has varied greatly from the fall of 
the Soviet Union to the present day.  Different elected officials have caused Ukraine to shift 
its focus from East to West, at times managing to balance the two sides.  In the period 
immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kravchuk managed to build relations with both Russia and the West, including a Nuclear 
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Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Budapest Memorandum guaranteeing Ukrainian 
sovereignty.  He was not, however, able to strengthen the nation economically.  Kravchuk’s 
successor, President Leonid Kuchma, ran as sympathetic to eastern Ukrainian concerns and 
issues, but instead enacted a constitution that did not allow dual citizenship or identify 
Russian as a state language.  Kuchma moved to end Crimean separatism and abolished the 
Crimean presidential office.  He also awarded Russia a 20-year lease on the port of 
Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula.  Additionally, Kuchma initially shunned the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), and Eurasian Economic Community (EEC) in favor of closer ties with NATO and 
the EU, with the goal of joining both organizations. Corruption and election rigging became 
the downfall of Kuchma’s alignment with the West.  In 2002 he began negotiating 
membership with the EEC and in 2003 began affiliating himself with CIS.  In 2004 following 
a meeting with Putin he shifted away from NATO and toward Russia.  Much as it had with 
Kravchuk, Ukraine suffered economically under Kuchma.  
 In late 2004 presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko lost the presidential runoff in 
what was widely considered a rigged election.  Yushchenko was an ethnic Ukrainian hailing 
from eastern Ukraine, and his run was so greatly opposed by the existing government in 
Ukraine that they targeted and even tried to poison him in an attempt to thwart his 
presidential bid.  His opponent, Viktor Yanukovych, was initially declared as the victor in the 
election, the results of which were ultimately thrown out.  The Orange Revolution served as 
the catalyst for this political shift with Ukrainians protesting in Kyiv’s independence square 
(the “Maidan”) for political change.  The result of these protests was a new election in which 
46 
 
Yushchenko was elected, and a constitutional change was made to shift power from the 
President to Parliament.   
 In the intervening years Ukraine continued to experience difficulties.  Infighting 
between Yushchenko and other government officials resulted in the position of Prime 
Minister changing hands two times in two years, continuous division, and rampant 
corruption.  During this period Yushchenko also tried to achieve a more significant role on 
the global stage by expressing interest in both EU and NATO partnerships, and expressed a 
strong sense of Ukrainian nationalism in ways that undermined Russian influence.  
Yushchenko’s anti-Russian sentiment and Ukraine’s poor economic performance played a 
role in the economic and diplomatic sparring over natural gas with Russia that began in 2006.  
Since the Cold War Russia provided its gas to its friends and allies at a heavy discount.  The 
continuance of the policy in the post-Cold War period allowed Russia a form of leverage to 
hold former allies close and encourage them to maintain the relationship.  Yushchenko’s 
decision to break with Russia resulted in a 2006 price hike that was quickly resolved with 
little issue and a three year deal.  In 2009, on the heels of a failed new deal, Russia cut gas 
entirely to Europe via Ukraine in the midst of winter.  The result ended up being a new ten 
year deal with terms that would continue to result in conflict during ensuing years.  The lack 
of cooperation amongst the government, issues of corruption, and economic challenges 
resulted in Yushchenko losing reelection in 2010 to his old rival, Yanukovych.   
 Yanukovych took a predictably hard turn toward Russia, creating concern among 
nationalist Ukrainians.  His signature on a 2012 law that allowed city and regional officials to 
make Russian their official language if at least ten percent of their citizens claimed to be 
native speakers further raised concerns.  As corruption and economic difficulties continued, 
47 
 
Yanukovych began to entertain closer association with the EU that would strengthen their 
economic standing, although it went against the wishes of Russian leadership. In November 
2013 Yanukovych abruptly ended the negotiations for an Association Agreement whose 
signature was imminent in favor of a turn toward Russia and a promised $15 billion aid 
package.  This decision became a Black Swan of sorts for Ukraine: an entirely unpredicted 
event that, while seemingly normal or minor, changes the course of geopolitics.
68
  After 
decades of economic challenges and political corruption, all of which had been largely 
unaffected by previous protests and demands for reform, the country erupted into what would 
rapidly become a civil war over an event that was just a repeat of former policies.   
 On November 21 protestors occupied the Maidan in what quickly became termed the 
Euromaidan protests.  These started small and peaceful, filled with citizens, particularly 
younger Ukrainians, who were there to oppose the turn from West to East.  In the movie 
“Winter on Fire,” one young man interviewed in the Maidan says he came to protest because 
“our government crossed out the future of Ukraine, and the aspirations of Ukrainian youth.  I 
came here to defend my future, the future of my children, compatriots and country.”
69
  The 
mood was jovial, with video footage showing the Maidan full of people cheering and 
dancing.   Ukrainian citizens waved the flags of Ukraine and the EU chanting “Ukraine is 
part of Europe” and “together till the end”; those present described the mood to be like a 
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festival and not a protest.
70
  The protestors were demanding that Yanukovych sign the 
association agreement and many felt as though they were duplicating the Orange Revolution.  
 On 29 November the protest took a sharp turn as police and the Berkut, a Ukrainian 
special police force with a history of violent crackdowns, began encircling the protestors.  
Video footage shows police in riot gear with shields and batons corralling chanting 
protestors.  Officers can be seen using batons to beat protestors who were backing away or 
already on the ground, some of whom had head and face injuries.  By 30 November the 
Maidan was largely empty, with remaining protestors having moved to St. Michaels Golden-
Domed Monastery.  The protestors filled the monastery to capacity, setting up food, medical, 
and legal aid stations.  Shortly after they returned to the Maidan as an estimated 800,000 
Ukrainians poured into Kyiv to protest the brutality.
71
 Polling and sentiments expressed to 
journalists showed they felt they were no longer protesting primarily for European 
integration but rather against the government repression of protestors.
72
  These protestors, 
many of who were unmasked and in plain clothes, marched on the Presidential Palace 
demanding change and peaceful revolution.  Future President Petro Poroshenko stood on a 
bulldozer used to challenge the police line saying “if we want revolution we need to involve 
them, not hit them.”
73
  Others, said by multiple sources to be provocateurs inserted by 
government forces to discredit the movement, were masked and instigated confrontations 
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   Allegations even exist that one of the men who framed himself as a 
“Ukrainian Nationalist Leader,” Dmytro Korchynsky, actually had close ties to the Kremlin 
and often spoke at pro-Putin summer camps in Russia.
75
  The provocateurs used the tractor to 
push down the concrete barricades police were behind, and wielded rocks and chains.  The 
provocation resulted in a significantly more brutal police response that began with stun 
grenades and tear gas.  By nightfall police could be seen in footage using batons to brutally 
beat random Ukrainians who they came upon, some lying in the streets trying to cover their 
heads.   
 On 2 December the protesters decided to remain in the Maidan until their demands 
were heard.  They were joined by military reservists and retirees and began building 
barricades and setting up aid stations providing food and warm clothes.  On 10 December 
leaders from the EU and United States, including Secretary of State John Kerry, meet with 
Yanukovych to try to find a solution.  During the meeting protestors were again surrounded 
by police and Berkut wearing body armor and helmets and carrying shields, to clear the 
Maidan.  Clergy was present and protest leaders asked police to not intervene.  As police 
began dismantling the barricades, female protesters were placed in the center of the crowd as 
men tried to create a human shield. Ukrainian police and Berkut began forcing their way 
among the protestors as the protestors responded with the Ukrainian national anthem.  St. 
Michaels Monastery began ringing all its bells in solidarity with the Maidan, an act that had 
not been seen since 1240 when Mongol-Tartars invaded Kyiv.
76
  The bells served as a call, 
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and citizens of Kyiv poured into the city center, forcing the police and Berkut to retreat 
without violence.  Following the meeting and the ringing of the bells Kerry released a 
statement condemning the violence and pronouncing that the official response “is neither 
acceptable nor does it befit a democracy.”
77
  He closed with the words, “As church bells ring 
tonight… the United States stands with the people of Ukraine.”
78
 
 After that the Euromaidan organized, building barriers, training for defense, and 
demanding a change from the government.  On 17 December Yanukovych and Putin signed 
the Ukrainian-Russian Action Plan that included the $15 billion in aid in the form of bond 
purchases.  Over the next month clashes between protestors and Berkut continued with 
human rights abuses occurring regularly.  On 16 January 2014 anti-protest laws were passed 
by the Parliament in a show of hands vote.  The laws would ban many elements of the protest 
to that point, including wearing masks and helmets, and result in jail time for those who 
disobeyed.  As January wore on the violence escalated with police, Berkut, and by that point 
Internal Forces who served as a military force fulfilling emergency police duties participating 
in the protest response.  Government forces raided and destroyed a Red Cross medical 
station, driving all the aid workers out.  They also began changing out their rubber bullets for 
real bullets, and taping pieces of shrapnel (including nails and bolts) to stun grenades.  The 
protestors for their part had increased the use of improvised weapons, including bricks and 
Molotov cocktails, in response to government forces.  At the end of January much of 
Parliament stepped down and the anti-protest laws were rescinded.   
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 As the Euromaidan entered February the revolution continued with a seemingly 
endless strength.  Ukrainians of all ages banded together to demand change and the removal 
of Yanukovych.  The week of 17 February was truly the beginning of the end for 
Yanukovych, although Ukrainian authorities had intended for it to be the beginning of the 
end of the Euromaidan.  Ukrainian news outlets have alleged that Yanukovych deployed a 
sniper team led by an officer from the Interior Ministry and a member of Berkut.
79
   
Additionally, there was alleged involvement by Russia in the form of teams from the Russian 
Defence Ministry and the Federal Security Service (FSB) to conduct anti-terrorist operations 
and a crackdown on the Euromaidan between 18 and 20 February.
80
  These teams also 
allegedly delivered grenades, explosives, and other equipment to Ukrainian authorities.
81
   
 On 18 February a march on Parliament saw a battle break out between police and 
protestors.  Both sides were armed with guns and multiple people from both sides were 
killed.  Yanukovych declared 20 February a day of mourning, but by 9 a.m. snipers were 
firing on protestors from government buildings.  Some protestors with military experience 
had received weapons and equipment and were able to identify and retake some of the sniper 
positions, but mostly the protestors continued fighting with rudimentary weapons and using 
the power their numbers provided.  That evening, Parliament motioned to end the crackdown 
on protestors as many government officials fled the city or even resigned their posts.  So 
great was the rush to leave that only 238 out of the 450 members of Parliament (MPs) were 
present for the vote.  In the evening hours of 21 February an agreement was reached that 
would rewrite the constitution by September and ensure a new election would take place in 
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December.  Additionally, it demanded that all groups would end the violence and protestors 
would essentially stand down.   On 22 February Yanukovych fled Kyiv and ended up in 
Sevastopol where he remained until he was evacuated to Russia a few days later.  Parliament 
voted to remove him from office, scheduled a new election for 25 May, and named 
Oleksandr Turchynov as the interim President until the soon-to-be elected Petro Poroshenko 
was sworn in on 7 June to a five-year term.  Russian President Vladimir Putin was quick to 
condemn the removal of Yanukovych from power, calling it a coup and assisting in his 
escape to Russia.  Putin would admit a year later that on the night of 22-23 February, after 
planning the rescue of Yanukovych, he informed gathered officials that “‘we are forced to 
begin the work to bring Crimea back into Russia’.”
82
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EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONISM ESCALATES 
“You have to understand, George [W. Bush], that Ukraine is not even a country.  Part of its 
territory is in Eastern Europe, and the greater part was given to them by us.”            
Vladimir Putin (Russian President) 
 
The Takeover of Crimea 
 On 22 February 2014 Ukraine officially turned away from Russia, dealing Russia a 
significant blow in a region where Kremlin leaders sought desperately to maintain influence.  
Historical tensions between Crimea and Ukraine provided an opportunity to regain some 
level of influence and damage Ukrainian territorial integrity and sovereignty by stoking local 
separatist sentiments already simmering below the surface.
83
  The protests and unrest in 
Crimea began on 23 February.  On 27 February militia and unidentified troops began taking 
over government facilities with support from the now disbanded Berkut.  On 18 March 
Russia officially annexed Crimea.  The rapid takeover gave the appearance of being 
coordinated ahead of time, catching much of the world off guard.   
 On 23 February protestors gathered in cities across Crimea including Sevastopol, the 
city where Russia’s Black Sea Fleet is headquartered, waving Russian flags and chanting 
“Russia!”  Protestors in some cities elected new leaders who they felt were more prepared to 
stand up to the new Ukrainian authorities, and multiple cities established militias for self-
defense.  Protestors on that day who were interviewed by journalists from The Guardian 
expressed a desire to secede after the events in Kyiv, even booing a local official who had 
said that Crimea could not be allowed to secede.
84
  Over the next few days many rallies took 
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place expressing loyalty to various sides; even Crimean Tartars joined the demonstrations 
chanting “Glory to Ukraine” in Ukrainian.
85
   
 On the morning of 27 February masked and uniformed men lacking any sort of 
national flag or other identifying insignia began seizing points of interest in Crimea.  The 
“little green men,” as they came to be known, seized airports, military bases, roads leading 
onto the peninsula from Ukraine, and government facilities over which the Russian flag was 
raised.  These little green men operated in units with matching uniforms and professional 
equipment including helmets and eyewear, much as a professional military would.  
Photographs show these troops in front of military vehicles with Russian tags, carrying 
Russian made rifles with both hands on their weapons, allowing for their positive and rapid 
control.  Reports indicated they operated with a level of professionalism not normally seen in 
militias, and spoke with Russian accents.  The roughly 30,000 to 35,000 troops were said to 
hail from multiple units both inside and outside the region, and included elements from the 
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU).
86
  However, Russian officials including Putin remained 
adamant that the men were not Russian forces but merely self-defense groups organized by 
locals with equipment and uniforms purchased at local stores.
87
  Russian military forces 
began holding “unrelated” military drills meant to ensure they were prepared “for action in 
crisis situations that threaten the nation’s military security” along the border with Ukraine but 
not Crimea.
88
   Spetsnaz, Russian Special Forces typically from the GRU, begin entering 
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Crimea on 1 March.  A Russian mechanized infantry brigade, a military unit comprised of 
infantry personnel who use armored personnel carriers that are either wheeled or tracked to 
improve mobility, was deployed on 12 March and joined on 14 and 15 March by artillery and 
surface-to-air missile elements.   
 Citizens in Crimea voted for the annexation of Crimea by Russia on 16 March.  RT, 
Russia’s English language media outlet started by State-owned RIA Novosti, reported on 17 
March that overall voter turnout was 81.37 percent with 95.7 percent voting in favor of the 
referendum, 3.2 percent voting to stay with Ukraine but as an Autonomous Republic, and 1.1 
percent of ballots classified as invalid.
89
  Crimean Prime Minister Sergey Aksyonov stated 
that 40 percent of Crimean Tartars voted in the referendum, and a majority of them voted in 
favor.
90
  RT also reported that the head of the election monitors’ commission, Polish MP 
Mateusz Piskorski, classified the vote as adhering to “the most basic, most important 
international standards” and stating “it was very professional but very calm, with all 
guarantees of safety at polling stations but without too much exposure of police presence at 
the polling stations.”
91
   
 Western nations and organizations viewed the referendum and the circumstances 
surrounding it in a different light.  EU leaders released a statement calling it “illegal and 
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illegitimate” and stating the “outcome will not be recognized [sic].”
92
  U.S. President Barack 
Obama called the referendum “a clear violation of Ukrainian constitutions and international 
law” and said “it will not be recognized by the international community.”
93
  Western media 
reported that many Tartars they spoke with had boycotted the vote and were opposed to 
annexation, saying the vote occurred under the watchful eye of armed Russian troops.
94
  
Almost two months after the vote, an English-language report was released and quickly 
removed (although a Russian language version remained) by Russia’s official Presidential 
Council on Civil Society and Human Rights with the actual referendum numbers.  The 
report, based on interviews with “numerous Crimean officials, experts, civil society leaders, 
and ordinary citizens,” states that voter turnout for the whole of Crimea ranged from 30-50 
percent with only 50-60 percent of those voters in favor of reunification, or 15-30 percent of 
eligible voters.
95
  The author points out issues discussed by other outlets, including the issue 
of “intimidation and violence by pro-Russia forces” and that while a “narrow majority” may 
have voted in favor, the issue was much more contentious than previously represented, and 
that significant repression of minorities and the press had already began.
96
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 The involvement in Crimea of Russian forces, something that Putin admitted to an 
extent as early as 17 April in a televised interview with the nation when he said “Russian 
servicemen did back Crimean self-defence [sic] forces,”
97
 was a significant violation of 
international law that seemed to catch Western leaders and international groups entirely 
unprepared.  The level of planning to undertake such a significant campaign of subversion 
that resulted in the seizure and annexation of sovereign territory in only 22 days from the 
initial protests (18 days from the arrival of troops) is unprecedented in the post-Cold War 
world.  The reality that this action was undertaken by Russia makes it even more ominous for 
Western leaders.   
 The Russian involvement in Crimea provides clear examples of maskirovka, from the 
presence of the little green men, to the constant vehement denials by Russian leaders and 
press of involvement, and in the manipulation of the actual voting process and subsequent 
voter turnout numbers.  In fact, Putin denied involvement to Russian media in April 2014 
stating multiple times that he “never intended to annex any territories, or planned any 
military operations there, never.”
98
  This statement was walked back in a rather matter-of-fact 
manner in March 2015 by Putin himself.
99
   Putin went so far as to admit personal 
involvement with the introduction of Russian forces while leaders of Russian state media 
simultaneously denied the reports to Western outlets when questioned, stating instead that the 
troops involved in the siege were “local self-defense forces, but not Russian troops.”
100
  This 
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deception would continue as Russia’s campaign to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and 
regain control of the country saw them entering combat operations in eastern Ukraine’s 
Donbas region, initially covertly (in Russia’s mind) and then overtly. 
Crisis in Donbas 
 The Donbas region, named for the Donets River Basin, comprises the oblasts of 
Donetsk and Luhansk, the easternmost provinces of Ukraine along the Russian border.  
Donbas is a largely industrial and mining region where 44 percent of citizens are ethnic 
Russians and 68 percent to 74 percent speak Russian as their primarily language, according 
to the 1989 and 2001 census (the most recently available).
101
  Opinion polls in these regions 
conducted in April 2014 by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology allow a look at the 
sentiments of southeastern Ukrainian citizens regarding the upheaval in general, but the 
Donbas in particular:  
 - 27.6-32.4% considered Yanukovych the legitimate President (the region as a whole 
 was 19.6%); 
 - 25-30% believed that the region should secede and join Russia (the next highest 
 oblast was 16.1% and the region as a whole was 15.4); 
 - 44.2-47% agreed Russia rightly protects the interests of Russian-speaking citizens 
 (the next highest oblast was 36.6% and the region as a whole was 32.6%); 
 - 43.4-48.3% believed Russian troops may invade and 19.3% would support the 
 invasion although 43.2-55.4% would stay at home (the region as a whole was 
 46.3%, 11.7%, and 46.9%, respectively); 
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These numbers tell a different story then the one that began at the time of the polling when 
pro-Russian separatists seized parts of Donbas.  These numbers indicate that a majority did 
not consider Yanukovych the legitimate president, and that a significant majority in the 
region did not support secession to Russia.  Even in Donbas, where conflict rages to this day, 
70 percent of polled citizens did not support secession even though over half believed that 
there would be a civil war and almost half believed Russian troops would become involved.  
In fact, it indicates that the level of support provided by the citizens of the region at the 
outbreak of hostilities was not enough to sustain the conflict to this point.  Russian 
involvement was vital to the continued destabilization of the region.   
 The conflict in eastern Ukraine started at the beginning of March when ethnic 
Russians began protesting and stormed some government facilities.  Some of the protestors 
were Ukrainian citizens who felt disenfranchised by the events in Kyiv, but others were 
Russian nationals bussed in as “protest tourists,” giving the appearance that a coordinated 
campaign of subversion stoking feelings of dissatisfaction with western Ukraine existed from 
the beginning.
103
  Soon thereafter, separatists and militias began to attempt to raise Russian 
flags, take over government facilities, and organize referendums similar to Crimea.  Counter-
protests were also held by those opposing Russian involvement and desiring to remain a part 
of Ukraine.  While the unrest was undoubtedly encouraged by Russian officials, initially 
there was no apparent involvement by Russian military forces.  The separatists were largely 
unprofessional forces, wearing a variety of clothing and lacking any military style gear or a 
distinct military decorum, a departure from what was seen in Crimea.  These protests served 
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to validate a narrative developed by Russia that Kyiv did not have the interests of ethnic 
Russians in mind and that those individuals preferred association with Russia.  In an effort to 
strengthen this sentiment Russia called the new Ukrainian leaders fascist and chastised Kyiv 
for allowing “armed bandits” to terrorize the region.
104
  A hashtag also began, much in the 
spirit of the #Euromaidan and other protests that have been organized or supported through 
social media, which translated roughly to “Russia does not leave its own behind.”
105
  This 
hashtag was used over 85,000 times and tweeted repeatedly by newly created twitter 
accounts in an effort to make it trend.
106
 
 Russian troops began gathering for “drills” along the border of Ukraine on 13 March, 
just days before the Crimea referendum vote.  The buildup was condemned by multiple 
world leaders, with some expressing concern that the Ukrainian crisis could develop into a 
confrontation between the East and West, reminiscent of Cold War era concerns.  The 
buildup reached 30,000 troops, and Russia began sending Special Forces and military 
equipment into eastern Ukraine to strengthen the rebellion.  In an attempt to allay the 
concerns of the citizens of eastern and southeastern Ukraine and stave off Russian 
intervention, Ukraine’s Prime Minister announced measures to decentralize the nation on the 
same day that Russia absorbed Crimea.  In announcing the measure the Prime Minister 
appealed for involvement in moving the country forward, attempting to ensure representation 
of all groups and to address the concerns of southeastern Ukraine.  Despite these efforts, 
violence and protests increased; on 6 April in a seemingly coordinated operation protestors 




 “#BBC Trending: Russian site recurits ‘volunteers’ for Ukraine,” BBC Trending, 





stormed and seized city halls in Donetsk, Kharkov, and Luhansk.  Protestors demanded an 11 
May referendum for autonomy and an 18 May referendum similar to that of Crimea’s for 
independence or seceding to Russia. There would be no middle ground.  Ukrainian forces 
regained control of the City Halls the next day, but protests and attempted seizures continued 
as it became apparent that the separatists were now receiving assistance from Russian 
“advisers.”  Additionally, world leaders and NATO again warned Russia to back away from 
the conflict and enacted more sanctions, but Russia’s mind was already made up.  The waters 
had been tested in Georgia and Crimea, and the Kremlin recognized that the rebukes by 
world leaders would not develop beyond that.  Putin now had an opportunity to reestablish 
his “Novorossiya” or New Russia, a region he claims belongs historically to Russia, 
including the very regions in which he was supporting separatist movements.  Putin again 
was using a questionable recounting of history to justify Russian actions.  This same concept 
would be raised over and over throughout the impending conflict, with the definition 
ultimately expanding to include the entirety of Ukraine.   It was on these many premises that 
Russia introduced forces and equipment to eastern Ukraine, changing the nature of the 
conflict and bolstering a separatist movement that lacked popular support, the necessary 
structure, or the capabilities to fight back against the Ukrainian government.   
 On 15 April, Ukrainian President Turchynov announced an “anti-terrorist operation” 
in the east by the army.  The operation came only a day after the Ukrainian government 
presented evidence to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) that 
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Russian forces were operating in eastern Ukraine.
107
  The evidence included photographs of 
separatists in both Crimea and eastern Ukraine with similar and at times identical uniforms, 
gear, and weapons.  The photographs indicate an increasing level of organization among 
separatists that is uncommon for non-military trained groups.  Additionally, there are a few 
men who appear in photographs from multiple cities, indicating that at least some advisors 
with a more professional military appearance were involved across the region.  World leaders 
also accused Russian forces of instigating the tensions in Ukraine, with General Philip 
Breedlove, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, providing key observations in a 
Business Insider article that indicated the introduction of Russian forces to the conflict.
108
  
Ultimately, the operation only increased tensions in the region as world leaders continued to 
call for de-escalation.  Ukraine was placed on “full combat alert” and reinstated conscription 
on 1 May, and the very next day fighting erupted in Odessa on the Black Sea, leaving 42 
dead.  On 7 May Putin’s rhetoric took a sharp, brief, and bizarre turn toward Western goals.  
He denounced the pending referendums for independence in eastern Ukraine, called for a 
cease fire, and requested dialogue between the opposing forces.  He also announced a 
withdrawal of Russian forces from the border, although NATO officials indicated that the 
troops remained in place.  In addition to the outright denial of involvement, Putin’s easily 
disproven claims regarding the status of Russian forces continue to the present day.   
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 On 11 May citizens of Donetsk and Luhansk voted for increased independence in a 
referendum condemned by the international community over concerns that the illegal vote 
would not be free and fair.  The verbiage on the ballot was overly vague, asking only if 
voters “support the act of self-rule.”  This created confusion among voters who were 
uncertain if it would increase autonomy, grant independence, or result in annexation by 
Russia.
109
  A Pew poll conducted before the vote indicated even greater uncertainty among 
eastern Ukrainians, even Russian speaking ones, showing that only 18 percent of eastern 
Ukrainians (including Russian speakers) and 27 percent of Russian speakers wanted to 
secede.
110
   
 Officials publically announced there would be no minimum turn out and established 
polling locations across the region, including in schools and hospitals.  Voting was also held 
at a polling station in Moscow for anyone with a Ukrainian passport.  As polls opened police 
and other armed men guarded polling locations, and sporadic conflict broke out between 
Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces.  A 2012 voters list was present at polling stations but 
multiple journalists reported that anyone with a passport was allowed to vote, even if their 
name was not on the list.  Some journalists observed people bringing multiple passports in 
order to fill out multiple ballots, and accusations were made that some polling locations did 
not even check passports, allowing Russians to vote.  Additionally, the lack of any 
international monitors and the reality that many of the staff at polling locations supported the 
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referendum created concern.  After polling ended the head of the Central Election 
Commission of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” told Russian media outlet RT that 74.87 
percent of eligible voters participated and that “the number of people who said no [to 
independence] was relatively small… 89.07 percent voted for, 10.19 percent voted against, 
and .74 percent of ballots were ineligible.”
111
  In Luhansk the Central Election Commission 
reported a 75 percent voter turnout with 96.2 percent supporting independence.
112
  Ukraine’s 
Interior Minister reported significantly different voter turnout numbers, with only 24 percent 
of eligible voters participating in Luhansk and 32 percent of eligible voters participating in 
Donetsk.
113
   
 The distortion of voter turnout and referendum results was similar to Crimea’s 
experience only two months earlier, giving the impression that the status of eastern Ukraine 
had already been decided prior to the referendum.  In fact, a leaked phone call between the 
founder of a Russian ultra-nationalist paramilitary group named Alexander Barkashov and an 
eastern Ukraine rebel leader indicates that the percentage of voters who said yes to an 
independent Donetsk was planned.  In the audio, Barkashov can be heard telling the rebel 
leader to “write something like 99% down… well, not 99%... Let’s say 89% voted for the 
Donetsk Republic.”
114
  The rigged referendum, down to 89 percent voting yes in Donetsk, 
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was meant to legitimize the plans Russia had already laid out, but had tried to deny days 
earlier, for the region.  On 12 May the regions formally asked to join Russia, although 
Russian leaders demurred instead calling again for dialogue.   
 The Russian handling of eastern Ukraine to a casual observer may have seemed to 
show a level of rationale regarding the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine.  In reality, the 
gestures and statements of dialogue were used to hide the larger strategy of irreparably 
damaging Ukraine’s sovereignty and forcing it back into the Russian sphere.  Eastern 
Ukraine had to be handled differently because the Russians lacked the widespread support 
there that they had seen in Crimea.  Additionally, European leaders and other former Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact nations would be even more strongly opposed to a full military invasion of 
eastern Ukraine than they were to Crimea, for which sanctions were already being handed 
down.  As the days and weeks passed Russia continued to participate in actions that were 
directly contradictory to their public statements, in some cases going to great lengths to deny 
the obvious.     
 Petro Poroshenko was elected 25 May, largely without the participation of eastern 
Ukraine due to violence, voter suppression, and even the kidnapping of election officials.  
Immediately following his election Poroshenko said he intended to visit Donbas in an effort 
to bring peace to the region, and Putin stated he would cooperate with the new authorities 
although he considered Yanukovych the legitimate president.  The two leaders met on 6 June 
at the 70
th
 anniversary of the D-Day landings and agreed that the hostilities needed to end, 
but instead the fighting intensified.  A week later on 14 June NATO released images 
suggesting Russia had supplied T-64 Main Battle Tanks to separatists.  The images, taken 
from a video posted on 11 June, showed T-64s without distinguishing markings (a tactic used 
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by Russian forces in Crimea) and featuring a different paint scheme than Ukrainian variants 
operating in two separate cities in eastern Ukraine.
115
  The T-64s joined an already growing 
list of Russian military equipment that had been given to separatists.  This included 
antiaircraft systems, one of which is a man-portable air defense system (MANPAD) with 
infrared homing designated by NATO as an SA-18 “Grouse”, which had been used multiple 
times since 29 May to shoot down Ukrainian military aircraft such as helicopters, an AN-30 
surveillance aircraft, and an IL-76 transport aircraft.  On 20 June a week-long cease-fire 
began that was extended on 27 June while Poroshenko signed an EU association agreement.   
 Three days later the Ukrainian military launched an offensive meant to destroy the 
insurgency.  Ukrainian forces pushed into rebel held territory, retaking control of cities and 
towns while advancing on Donetsk and Luhansk.  The separatists were retreating, destroying 
bridges and fortifying rear positions.  On 11 July a Ukrainian military transport aircraft was 
shot down from an altitude of 6,500 meters (21,000 feet), almost double the altitude of the 
SA-18 used against Ukrainian aircraft the month prior.  Separatist forces had gained access to 
more advanced surface to air missiles (SAMs) and were actively using them against 
Ukrainian forces.  The Russian commitment of equipment to the fight increased rapidly and 
dramatically.  On 14 July, the U.S. Department of State reported the following changes to the 
battlespace in eastern Ukraine: 
 - Russian forces deployed additional tanks, armored vehicles, multiple rocket 
 launchers (MRLs), artillery (ARTY), and advanced air defense systems at site in 
 southwest Russia, probably for delivery to separatists;
116
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, and multiple other infantry fighting 
 vehicles (IFVs) and armored personnel carriers (APCs) were delivered to separatists;  
 - Ukrainian forces discovered caches of MANPADs, mines, grenades, meals ready to 
 eat (MREs), vehicles, and even a pontoon bridge;  
 - Unspecified Russian equipment with documentation providing proof of Russian 
 origin was found in recaptured areas;  
 - Recruiting efforts in Russia for volunteers capable of operating heavy weapons, 




The Downing of Malaysian Airlines (MH) Flight 17 
 On 17 July citizens around the world who had largely been ignoring the conflict were 
shocked when separatists shot down MH17, a commercial airliner cruising at 33,000 feet 
with 298 civilian passengers onboard.  MH17 had been on a transcontinental flight from 
Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur and was over eastern Ukraine when hit by what is now known 
to be a SAM designated by NATO as an SA-11 “Gadfly.”
124
  World leaders immediately 
called for accountability and the UN held an emergency session.  The primary question 
initially was who did it.  Western leaders believed it was either the separatists using Russian 
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equipment, although they claimed to lack the capabilities to shoot down an airliner, or 
Russian forces operating in Ukraine.  The latter was assessed to be a possibility because of 
the advanced nature of the weapons system necessary to engage and destroy an aircraft at 
that altitude. It is not a simple point-and-shoot process like that used with  a MANPAD but 
actually requires missile guidance systems and radar.  Russia immediately blamed Ukraine, 
touting theories that it was a Ukrainian fighter aircraft or Ukrainian ground forces.  Russia 
also claimed Ukraine was at fault because their campaign, which began earlier that month, 
had dramatically escalated the ground war in the region.   
 Within two days the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine had released a statement assessing that 
MH17 was brought down by an SA-11 fired from separatist controlled territory.  The 
embassy states that this was likely Russian equipment fired by separatists, pointing out that 
Ukraine does own SA-11s but none was within range of the incident and Ukrainian forces 
had not fired a single SAM during the hostilities despite repeated violations of Ukrainian 
airspace by Russian aircraft.  The embassy pointed to the Russian weapons and equipment 
that had been pouring into Ukraine in previous days and evidence of Russia providing 
training on SAM systems to separatists.  They also explained that on the day of the tragedy 
sensors detected a SAM launch, believed to be an SA-11, from separatist controlled territory.  
Even more incriminating was the release of intercepted separatist communications from a 
few days prior to the incident discussing the repositioning of an SA-11 system, and the 
release of intercepted communications from immediately after where separatists report 
shooting down an aircraft.  Immediately following the crash multiple separatists, including 
the “Defense Minister” of Donetsk People’s Republic, bragged about shooting down a 
military transport aircraft on social media; the posts were quickly deleted when it came out 
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that the aircraft was actually a civilian airliner.  Finally, video posted to social media showed 
an SA-11 on a transport vehicle traveling toward Russia and missing at least one missile, 
indicating it had been recently fired.
125
 
 For their part, the Russians repeatedly and strongly denied any connection to the 
downing of MH17.  Four days after MH17 was shot down representatives from the Ministry 
of Defense gave a briefing to the media meant to absolve Russia of any guilt.  The Russian 
report agrees that SA-11s were deployed to the region and provides imagery as proof, 
although they claim that these were Ukrainian systems.  The report also claims that an SU-25 
was within the range of MH17 to effectively engage and destroy the aircraft with its onboard 
air-to-air missile system. Although the Russian authorities do not specifically blame Ukraine 
in this document for shooting down MH17, they seem to imply guilt while also attempting to 
discredit the international accusations that a Russian SA-11 in separatist control was the 
guilty system.  Russian authorities even go so far as to deny that Russia delivered any SA-
11s “and other equipment” to the separatists.  In the course of the statements Russia also 
indicates that U.S. intelligence had the necessary collection sensors in the region to prove 
who and what shot down the system, indicating that the US should release that intelligence as 
proof.
126
  Essentially, Russian statements by the Ministry of Defense representatives were 
meant to deny involvement while not providing any tangible evidence of a lack of 
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involvement, place blame on Ukraine using specious evidence, and demand that the US 
release more tangible (and classified) evidence of Russian guilt. 
   These tactics and denials continued into October 2015 when the Dutch report on 
MH17 crash findings was released.  The report did identify the missile as an SA-11, although 
it did not place blame for who launched the missile.  In response, RT published an interview 
with the lead Russian investigator from the Federal Air Transport Agency (Rosaviatsia), 
Oleg Storchevoy, attacking the position of the Dutch investigation, and accusing them of 
disregarding Russian comments, and “slanting the documents towards their version of events 
beforehand.”
127
  Russian authorities, via the article, denied almost every relevant finding 
including the type of missile launched, the location and trajectory of the launch, and the 
chemical composition and shape of the missile fragments.  Russian authorities also accused 
Dutch investigators of disregarding Russian air traffic control radar, claiming that this was 
the only data because there was no Ukrainian air traffic control data, and accusing the 
investigators of shutting Russia out of the investigation.
128
  In reality, the report on the 
investigation identifies Russia as a participant in the investigation and explains what material 
Russia provided.
129
  Additionally, Appendix I of the report features images of the Ukrainian 
and Russian air traffic control radar and commentary on the images.
130
  And while the report 
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does not specifically blame Russia it is damning regarding Russian involvement in Ukraine, a 
fact that Russia adamantly denied until December 2015 despite obvious evidence to the 
contrary.   
Continued Escalation in Donbas 
 MH17 escalated the conflict in eastern Ukraine significantly, with August 
experiencing some of the bloodiest fighting in all of 2014.
131
  Ukraine was gaining territory 
and rocketing rebel held areas; they had the momentum and were poised to crush the 
separatists who only held a pocket of territory in Donetsk oblast around the city of Donetsk 
and toward the border of Luhansk oblast, and the southern portion of Luhansk oblast.  Putin 
was in a position where his options were to send the Russian Army across the border and 
essentially take control of Ukraine, or continue on the current path but with Russian 
commanders leading the rebels.
132
  Allowing the rebels to lose was not an option for Putin, 
nor was he prepared to blatantly invade Ukraine, leaving a “subtle” (in Russia’s eyes) 
continued introduction of Russian military forces and commanders as the only viable option.  
On 22 August Russia sent an unmarked “aid convoy” to eastern Ukraine under escort of pro-
Russian gunmen.  Russian authorities claimed the convoy had been “prepared in an 
atmosphere of full transparency with Ukraine and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC)” although both Ukraine and the ICRC deny any involvement.
133
  Russian 
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authorities cautioned that any delays of the convoy were “unacceptable” and that any attempt 
to stop them would result in unspecified action.
134
  
 On 27 August rebels backed by Russian equipment gained control of the region 
surrounding town of Novoazovsk on the Sea of Azov,
135
 directly across the border from 
Russia.  On 28 August NATO released a report stating that satellite imagery showed Russian 
self-propelled artillery units and combat troops operating inside Ukraine.  NATO officials 
characterized it as a “significant escalation” and a “blatant attempt to change the momentum 
of the fighting.”
136
  Ukrainian forces also began capturing Russian forces in late August, 
while separatists reported Russians fighting alongside separatist forces, although they 
characterized these Russians as civilians or service members taking leave to volunteer.   A 
ceasefire was signed on 5 September, although it was used primarily to rebuild forces in 
preparation for fighting that would erupt four days later at the Donetsk airport.  By mid-
September separatist forces were in control of almost double the territory prior to the 
ceasefire, now holding the border region from the Sea of Azov part way between Mariupol 
and Novoazovsk, as far west as the city of Donetsk in some areas and as far north as the city 
of Luhansk.   




 The Sea of Azov is north east of the Black Sea and is bordered by Ukraine on the north, 
Crimea to the west and south, and Russia to the east and south.  Russia is currently in the 
process of building a bridge across the strait that separates Crimea and Russia on the 
southern portion of the sea.  
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Figure 1: Map of eastern Ukraine for reference
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 In late September NATO began reporting Russian withdrawals from east Ukraine, 
and while fighting did ease up, it did not stop between separatists and Ukrainian forces.  On 2 
November the separatists held elections with the support of Russia.  These were denounced 
by the West, and within a matter of days Russian troops were again entering eastern Ukraine 
as fighting increased.  As the months wore on this pattern would be repeated.  On 12 
February 2015 a new ceasefire was signed, and within days fighting restarted as separatist 
forces gained more territory.  In March the U.S. promised nonlethal military aid to Kyiv, 
while reaffirming that no military action would be taken.  In May Russia moved to classify 
the deaths of soldiers in Ukraine as having occurred during peacetime operations, probably in 
response to increasing reports of Russian troops imprisoned and killed in combat operations 
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in Ukraine, and possibly in preparation for another operational push.
138
  In late June footage 
taken by a drone in May and June was released showing evidence of a Russian military 
training facility in eastern Ukraine.
139
  Throughout the remainder of 2015 fighting continued, 
halted only occasionally by unsuccessful cease fires.  Russia continued to provide heavy 
weapons to separatists while denying any involvement in the region.  The West continued 
enacting sanctions while Russia established sanctions of its own.  On 17 December Putin 
finally admitted the presence of Russians in Ukraine when he responded to a reporter’s 
question about Russian military intelligence officers captured by Kyiv.  He stated: “‘we 
never said there were not people there who carried out certain tasks, including in the military 
sphere’,” although he also said that this was different than regular Russian troops, who he 
still insisted were not there.
140
   
 As 2016 began the fighting in eastern Ukraine had become status quo.  Russia 
showed no signs of easing up its pressure on Ukraine, although it continues to deny 
involvement.  Ukraine, in the midst of a political and economic crisis, still seeks to stabilize 
the nation and receive economic assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
although the country is worn down from two years of constant crisis.  Sanctions remain in 
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place against Russia, and while they have certainly impacted the nation economically they 
show no signs of inspiring the Kremlin to give up its campaign against Ukraine.  Putin does 
not yet show signs of wavering; instead he just seems to be expanding his scope.          
The Revival of Cold War Scare Tactics 
 Russia’s recent aggression has been directed most obviously at Ukraine, although it is 
not the Kremlin’s only target.  Russia has increased subversion campaigns against multiple 
former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations who are refusing to play by Russia’s rules and 
removing themselves from the Russian sphere of influence.  Nations who have remained 
aligned with Russia are largely untouched by this new campaign.  But nations who have 
turned to the West, particularly Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have been in Russian 
cross hairs.  Additionally, Russia has undertaken various campaigns meant to showcase 
Russian military capabilities to Western nations, with some tactics having a scope and 
complexity not seen since the Cold War.   
 The Russian excuse for involvement in Ukraine, protecting the right of ethnic 
Russians, is part of a larger propaganda campaign that has caused concern in former Soviet 
and Warsaw Pact nations.  The sudden dissolution of the USSR, and the policies of 
Russification under the Soviet regime, ensured that Russian interests and influences became 
an inseparable part of many nations.  Ethnic Russians do still comprise portions of the 
populations in many former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations, and many of them have links to 
Russia from the Soviet era that include family and military service.  Additionally, Russian is 
still spoken to some extent in many of these countries, even though it may not be an official 
language.  Russia has used this reality, and Russian-language TV and radio broadcasts to 
former Soviet and Warsaw Pact nations, to sow seeds of unrest and discontent among these 
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populations.  This has been particularly disconcerting for the Baltic nations who were 
invaded and annexed by the USSR during World War II (WWII) as part of their expansion 
campaign and are the only former Soviet states that have joined Western organizations such 
as NATO and the EU.    
 In Latvia, where one third of the population is ethnic Russians, the statement by a 
Russian diplomat that alleged discrimination against ethnic Russians would cause 
“unfortunate consequences” raised serious concerns that echo in Lithuania and Estonia.
141
  In 
Estonia the government set up a Russian-language TV channel meant to “empower the local 
identity” and counter Russian propaganda that included accusations of Estonia’s support of 
Nazism.
142
  Lithuania’s president has also spoken bluntly about the increasing threats from 
Russia, statins that propaganda and disinformation campaigns have already placed the 
country under attack.
143
  Even British Defense Secretary Michael Fallon warned that NATO 
must be ready to “repel Russian Aggression” as the Russian government attempts to 
destabilize the region.
144
  In Poland, Russian propaganda accused the government of training 
Ukrainians protesting in the Euromaidan and has waged what Polish leaders characterized as 
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the beginning of a “hybrid war.”
145
  Russian propaganda in the region reached such a fever 
pitch as to cause western leaders to characterize it as potentially being more dangerous than 
conventional forces because of its impact on regional security.
146
  RT, a key component of 
Russian information warfare aimed at the West, has been central to the subversion 
campaigns.  Its English language articles often make outrageous and unbelievable claims that 
have minimal basis in reality.  Some have argued that they are not meant to be believable, but 
rather meant to slowly tear down the reader’s mental defenses.
147
  These focused propaganda 
efforts (soft power) are then complimented by military show of force type exercises (hard 
power), meant to further engrain the idea of a strong and aggressive Russia that poses a 
significant threat to western interests.   
 Over the last two years headlines regularly pop up that raise alarms regarding Russian 
military actions.  The most common articles are about Russian air activity, which 
experienced a significant spike in aggressive air patrols in late 2014 that included dangerous 
maneuvers.
148
   Russian air patrols were a normal military occurrence during the Cold War, 
dropping off after the fall of the Soviet Union due to budget cuts, and making a comeback in 
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  Longer-range patrols, common during the Cold War, are becoming more 
commonplace along the U.S. and Canadian borders and are typically conducted by Russian 
bombers capable of carrying cruise missiles.  In the European theater Russian fighters, 
bombers, and other aircraft have been used to regularly conducting overflights of Western 
military forces, including U.S. ships, and to violate the national airspace of various nations.  
While the overflights are largely harmless, other than the unsafe maneuvers that have been 
undertaken at times, they send a message of an increasingly strong Russian military that can 
reach out and touch super powers and other states that have exerted control over them since 
the Soviet collapse.   Additionally, Russian military drills along the borders of Western 
nations have allowed Russia to ensure that their military capability on the ground is front and 
center.   
 Russia blames the current security situation in Europe on the West for expanding 
NATO and the EU to Russia’s borders, an aggression in Russia’s eyes that must be 
countered.  This is not entirely inaccurate; the West did expand toward Russia’s borders, 
undoubtedly leaving Russian leaders feeling encroached upon.  But that is not to say the 
expansion of NATO and the EU was wrong, rather that it may not have been handled 
properly, leaving Russians feeling as though they had been backed into a corner.
150
  If history 
has shown anything, it is that Russian leaders do not appreciate feeling cornered or 
surrounded.  This statement especially rings true for Putin, a leader who views himself as 
capable of returning Russia to its former glory and seemingly longs for the days of the Soviet 
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Union.  This feeling of being treated as inferior and being removed from significant global 
events caused Russia to lash out in Eastern Europe.  The ongoing conflict in Syria, a nation 
ruled by Russian ally Bashar al-Assad and in which Russia has significant military interests, 
has provided another frontier on which to assert themselves as a power player.  The ongoing 
conflict in that country is the current focus of global superpowers, and Russian involvement 




A SHIFT TO SYRIA 
“We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and 
its armed forces who are valiantly fighting terrorism face to face.  We should finally 
acknowledge that no one but President Assad's armed forces and (Kurdish) militia are truly 
fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria”               
Vladimir Putin (Russian President) 
 
 Russian intervention in the Syrian Civil War is, on its face, another opportunity for 
Russian President Vladimir Putin to be contrarian to Western goals and interests while 
flexing his military capability and intertwining Russia with any regional resolution of the 
conflict.  This is not a new development, though.  Russian interest in Syria predates Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad and Putin, and it runs deeper than countering Western influence.  
Economically, strategically, and geographically, Syria matters to Russia.  Because of this, it 
is extraordinarily important in Russia’s eyes to maintain a pro-Russian regime in the country, 
and Assad is currently that regime.     
Russian Regional Interests 
 Historically, Russia has maintained ties with multiple nations in the region.  These 
ties have ebbed and flowed based on regional and global events.  Prior to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union some nations in the Middle East and North Africa were significant recipients of 
Soviet arms exports.  From the mid-1950s to 1960 Egypt and Indonesia received 50 percent 
of Soviet arms sales and Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria accounted for another one third.
151
  In 
the 1970s the Arab Middle East comprised at least 70 percent of all Soviet arms sales to non-
communist developing countries including tanks, helicopters, fighters, and other advanced 
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  In the 1980s the Soviet Union was the primary arms supplier for five of 
the seven major importers, including Iraq, Libya, and Syria.
153
  And while Soviet action in 
Afghanistan caused them to fall out of favor with many in the region, Syria has been the 
constant.   
 Syria first began purchasing weapons from the Soviet Union in 1950 and has sourced 
the vast majority of its military arsenal from the USSR and then Russia.
154
  The exact 
numbers, at least in the present day, are difficult to find because Russia does not publish 
arms-export data.  However, in 2012 Amnesty International published an estimate that 10 
percent of all Russian arms exports are to Syria.
 155
  These are said to include equipment such 
as fighters, helicopters, other aircraft, tanks, various missile and rocket systems, and small 
arms.  Even as civil war raged in Syria arms exports did not cease.  In February 2012 
Vyacheslav N. Davidenko, the chief spokesman for Russian state-owned weapons trading 
company Rosoboronexport, called the Syrian crisis “aggravated” but said in the absence of 
international decisions, sanctions, and a directive from the Kremlin they would not halt 
sales.
156
  Satellite imagery dated 15 September 2015 showed newly emplaced artillery pieces, 
indicating weapons were still being provided to Syria.  A Syrian military source confirmed 
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this to Reuters, stating that Syrian troops received and were trained on new systems that 
allowed engagement with air and ground targets.
157
   
 Strategically, Syria hosts Russian forces at a deep water naval base in the port of 
Tartus that they have used since 1971.  Historically, the port has been used to deliver 
weapons to Syria as part of the larger arms trade, although it also hosted naval logistics 
services for Soviet and Russian ships.  It is also one of the few warm-water ports in the 
region that Russia has access to in the winter.
158
  The other two, Murmansk and Sevastopol, 
are better-equipped naval facilities but both have shortcomings.  Murmansk, located off the 
Barents Sea in the far north of Russia, does not freeze because of the North Atlantic Current.  
However, in order for naval vessels from the port to gain access to the north Atlantic they 
must pass through the Barents and Norwegian Seas, a fairly long distance.  Sevastopol is 
more conveniently located in the Black Sea and is under full control of Russian forces since 
the annexation of Crimea.  The issue with Sevastopol is that any ships departing the Black 
Sea must pass through the Bosporus Straits, which are under the control of Turkey, a NATO 
member nation, simplifying the process of a naval blockade in the event of conflict.   
 Tartus’ location on the Mediterranean ensures that if Russia has ships operating in the 
Mediterranean and Middle East that they will always have a logistics point available to them.  
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It could also someday provide a base from which to operate permanently stationed Russian 
vessels that would have ready access to the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and 
Arabian Sea.  Because Tartus could not be blockaded as easily as Sevastopol it is important 
to maintain the facility and this access.  It also allows a naval presence in countries and 
regions that have been important to Russia’s policies and strategy in the far abroad, allowing 
influence to extend beyond the immediate Russian borders.  Unfettered naval access to the 
Arabian Sea in particular is important because of the significant regional interests in the 
Middle East, India, and Africa, and the reality that naval forces at the other major warm-
water naval bases that are not easily blockaded, such as Murmansk and Vladivostok, would 
require several weeks underway to reach the region.  Additionally, maintaining Tartus allows 
Russia to further develop a logistics point that is vital to the operations of a blue-water 
Navy.
159
   
 Tartus is not a Russian-owned facility, nor does it have warships permanently 
stationed there.  Its classification as a deep-water facility means it can host a variety of 
vessels with deeper drafts, including nuclear submarines.  Recent reporting by Russian outlet 
The Moscow Times indicates work is being done on the facility to make it a “full scale naval 
base” that would provide improved logistical support to Russian vessels in the region and 
possibly host even larger ships.
160
  In addition to being used as a weapons delivery facility 
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and a logistics point for ships in the Mediterranean, it has also been used as a point of entry 
for covert Soviet and Russian forces operating in the county.  In 1983 a Soviet anti-aircraft 
unit was delivered to the port on board a cruise ship in an effort to hide its affiliation with the 
Red Army.  The unit was responsible for setting up surface to air missile (SAM) batteries 
meant to deter Israeli aircraft that may fly into Syria, and to shoot them down if necessary.  
Syria also hosted Soviet and then Russian forces in the early 1990s; these forces trained a 
Syrian missile defense unit on Soviet missile systems and reported that Syrian citizens 
viewed them as “protectors.”
161
  Over the course of Russian involvement in Syria the port of 
Tartus has hosted various warships, including amphibious landing ships.  Additionally, 
Russian forces have delivered weapons systems, “military specialists” to train Syrian forces 




 In early September 2015 Russian forces began the process of setting up facilities, 
including modular buildings and an air traffic control system, at an air base in Latakia, a 
Syrian port city 50 miles north of Tartus.  The construction at the air base, which appeared to 
be able to hold 1,000 troops and had cargo and passenger aircraft coming and going, raised 
concerns for world leaders that Russia was going to prop up a regime that many had 
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proclaimed should step down.
163
 On 30 September Russian aircraft, launched out of Latakia, 
began striking targets in Syria.  The air strikes were described by Major General Igor 
Konashenkov, a spokesman for Russia’s Defense Ministry, as precision strikes aimed at 
“military equipment, communications centers, transport vehicles, arms depots, ammunition 
and fuels and lubricant materials belonging to ISIS terrorists.”
164
  United States Secretary of 
Defense Ash Carter countered Russian statements regarding the airstrikes, informing 
reporters that the airstrikes were actually targeting US backed moderate rebel groups opposed 
to Assad’s rule and were conducted in areas not held by ISIS.
165
  Russian airstrikes continued 
throughout the month of October with non-ISIS groups opposed to Assad’s rule as their 
primary targets.  Additionally, Russia began launching cruise missiles from multiple surface 
ships operating in the Caspian Sea in October.  The cruise missiles were coordinated with the 
ongoing air strikes and provided support to pro-Assad ground forces that were launching an 
offensive at the time.  Russia claimed that the strikes were aimed at ISIS, though reporting 
indicates that they were still targeted at anti-Assad forces.  On 31 October a Russian airliner 
flying at 31,000 feet over Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula crashed into the desert, an act Russia 
alleges was the result of an ISIS planted bomb, causing Russia to turn their focus, at least 
temporarily, to ISIS forces in Syria.
166
  By mid-November Russia had begun using tactical 
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aircraft and long range bombers outfitted with an air-launched cruise missile to conduct air 
strikes on ISIS targets in eastern Syria, notifying US forces prior to the first strikes in an 
attempt to avoid an incident.  Additionally, media reports indicate that Russia continued 
cruise missile strikes from Caspian Sea-based surface vessels, which primarily were aimed at 
ISIS targets but may have also destroyed rebel targets.  In all, over 100 cruise missiles were 
launched in a four-day period in mid-November.
167
  Russia’s grand finale of sorts with their 
cruise missile launches came on 8 December when a Russian diesel-electric powered 
submarine that had recently completed sea trials launched multiple cruise missiles at ISIS 
targets in Syria.   
 The launch of cruise missiles from long-range bombers, surface ships, and 
submarines is not unheard of in times of conflict; the US has used them in multiple recent 
conflicts, including Syria.  The unique aspect of Russia’s cruise missile launches in Syria in 
November and December of 2015 is that they were all weapons systems that had not seen 
combat before.  This is a stark difference from the US Tomahawk cruise missile that was first 
deployed in 1984 and has been fired over 2,000 times in combat missions.  The Kh-101
168
 
was launched from long-range bombers at ISIS targets, with some calling it an odd pick 
because it severely outmatched the ISIS targets it was up against, leaving some to opine that 
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it was used to show off Russian capabilities.
169
   The 3M14T
170
 was launched from surface 
ships and a newly fielded submarine having just completed trials in October; the Russian 
Defense Ministry reported that the launches occurred while the submarine was submerged 
but video indicates the vessel was operating on the surface.
171
  Once again, the launches 
demonstrated a significant advance in Russian technology that shows they have “closed the 
gap between the U.S. in conventional defense technology.”
172
 
 In mid-February it was estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 Russian personnel and 70 
aircraft were in Syria, with bombers also launching from Russia to support air strikes.
173
  
Additionally, Russian Spetsnaz (Special Forces) were deployed to Syria prior to the official 
intervention and remained following the drawdown.  Their primary functions were to 
conduct reconnaissance and provide special security for Russian facilities and assets; they 
were not however believed to be involved in direct combat operations (a direct departure 
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from other recent Spetsnaz activities in Crimea and Ukraine).
174
  Even though Russia has 
avoided a commitment of ground forces, their support of Assad through air strikes and 
artillery has assisted the regime in gaining territory from rebel groups as well as ISIS.  On 11 
February a multinational meeting in Munich called for a reduction in hostilities against all 
targets except al Nusra and ISIS within a week.  Only days later civilian areas with two 
schools and five medical centers (including a Doctors Without Borders hospital) in rebel held 
towns were targeted by either Russian or Syrian missiles.
175
  These attacks, unfortunately 
causing only a continuance of civilian loss of life in the conflict, drew significant 
international condemnation with United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calling 
them a “blatant violation of international law.”
176
 
 A ceasefire went into effect in Syria on 27 February with a goal of increasing 
humanitarian aid and moving Syria toward a political transition that could bring an end to 
hostilities.  Russia announced a withdrawal of forces from Syria on 14 March due to Russian 
success in achieving objectives in the nation and the ongoing peace talks.  The decision 
caught many off guard, although some were quick to point out that it was a withdrawal in 
name only.  Russia sent some troops home but ensured some stayed behind to provide 
logistical support to assets still in country.  Additionally, some Russian aircraft returned 
home only to be replaced by new tactical aircraft (although possibly at lower levels than 
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  Russia also maintained anti-access area denial weaponry that could establish a 
no-fly zone and prevent the establishment of a humanitarian corridor for safe delivery of 
aid.
178
  The remaining forces allow Russia to continue airstrikes in support of Assad and 
more significantly act as a deterrent against Western action against Assad.  In fact, Putin has 
openly threatened that they could reconstitute forces in a matter of hours and that they would 
shoot down “any target” that violated Syrian air space.
179
  
 On 24 March, almost a month after the cease fire began, US Secretary of State John 
Kerry characterized the situation as including “improvements on the ground” that were 
“‘welcome but not sufficient, nor permanent’.”
180
  This characterization came after a four-
hour-long meeting with Putin in which they continued to discuss the way forward, including 
a possible political transition, and even touched on issues in Ukraine.  Additionally, peace 
talks have been ongoing in Geneva in an attempt to resolve the situation on the ground.  The 
reality, though, is that Russian forces remain a central part of Assad’s operations in Syria.  
The announcement of a drawdown was merely for show.  Russian Chief of Staff Valery 
Gerasimov told Russian media on 28 March that the battle for Palmyra in Syria was fought 
by Assad’s forces with the support of Russian aircraft, Special Forces, and military 
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  The inclusion of Special Forces as separate from advisors in this statement 
implies that the Special Forces did not act in the capacity of advisers but rather combatants, a 
point some journalists have begun to raise.
182
  Reuters reporting from 30 March also 
discusses continued Russian involvement in Syria and highlights Russian attempts to conceal 
their involvement.  Reuters reporting indicates that in the weeks following the drawdown 
Russian ships have delivered more military equipment and supplies to Syria than they have 
removed.
183
  In fact, the deliveries (at this point it is unclear what the cargo specifically is) 
are so heavy that civilian photographs of the ships transiting between the port of 
Novorossiysk
184
 in the Black Sea and Tartus indicate ships inbound for Tartus sit 
significantly lower in the water than those outbound from Tartus.
185
  Additionally, Reuters 
reports that it appears the presence of warships in the Mediterranean has increased since the 
“withdrawal” to nearly one dozen, probably to protect the cargo ships but also to provide 
naval fire support.
186
  In addition to the military ships, civilian cargo ships have made trips to 
Syria with military equipment onboard.  Interestingly, Reuters reports that some vessels with 
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onboard transponders meant to broadcast their locations to fellow vessels were switched off 
prior to reaching Syria, and did not come back online until they were en route back to 
Russia.
187
   
 The path forward in Syria is far from clear at this point.  The nation, long an ally, 
provides Russia a unique opportunity to exert a significant amount of influence in a far 
abroad
188
 region that also has strategic implications for Western countries.  The ongoing 
conflict in the Middle East, the US’s ongoing involvement in the region, and Russia’s history 
with and interests in Syria provide an opportunity for Russian leadership to counter the U.S. 
on “neutral” (not quite NATO, save for Turkey, and not Eastern Europe) territory.  It also 
allows Russia to directly challenge an ongoing U.S. strategic interest where American and 
Western forces have been unable to reach a resolution.  If Russia can “defeat” ISIS and make 
a deal with Assad they force the West to acknowledge their importance.   
 Additionally, the ongoing operations in the Middle East serve a larger purpose to 
undermine the effectiveness of American leaders or simply to highlight their ineffectiveness 
to American citizens.  This second part is important, and it is a central component of the 
ongoing propaganda blitz by Russia.  Social media postings began circulating following the 
Russian entrance into Syria that have “demonstrated” the Russian “prowess” at dealing with 
ISIS where the US has “failed.”  It has appealed to a group of Americans who are largely 
dissatisfied with current US policy in the region, which they perceive as weak.  Russia’s 
attempts to paint itself as decisive and successful against ISIS underscores the Russian 
narrative that US leaders are the problem and Russian leaders offer the solution.  If Russia 
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can win the propaganda war in the Middle East against the US then it can more successfully 
launch a propaganda campaign regarding its near abroad
189
 that could potentially undermine 
US support for countries seeking to break from the Russian sphere.  The reality that it is also 
an election year for the US undoubtedly plays a role, and it is in Russia’s interests to see a 
nationalist president elected who finds NATO and the EU a waste of American time and 
money.  If Russian leaders can play to already existing tensions in the American political 
sphere, specifically isolationism and distance from significant Western institutions, they 
further cement their ability to exert influence in both the near and far abroad without 
American meddling for at least four years.    
 Ultimately, Russian involvement in Syria has much more to do with economy and 
geography.  It addresses a Russian strategy that extends far beyond destroying “terrorists” 
and propping up an ally.  Direct involvement in Syria is the most effective way Russia can 
counter Western policies.  It is a means by which Russia can address issues in the near 
abroad by forcing engagement in the far abroad, and it ensures that all paths of resolution (at 
least in Syria, for now) go through Russia.   
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IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY 
“If this [stationing more NATO troops in Eastern Europe] isn’t preparing for another Cold 
War, what is it for then?  For a hot war?  Such is the reality.”                       
      Dmitry Medvedev (Russian Prime Minister) 
 
 The rumblings of a new Cold War have been increasing in strength and coming from 
politicians and scholars on both sides of the issue  Western leaders view Russia as pushing 
the world toward a new standoff, and Russia views the west as making provocative moves.  
As western organizations, particularly North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU), have expanded to Russia’s borders, so has Russia sought to push back 
and expand its own organizations and interests.  A strengthening Russian economy in recent 
years has resulted in significant military expansions and advanced weapons programs.  This 
has allowed Russians to return to what they view as their rightful place as a super-power.  
However, there is one major issue: The West refuses to accept that Russia is a global power 
player and still treats it as the loser in the larger geopolitical realm.
190
  That is not to say that 
Russia did not experience a significant degradation after the Cold War, rather that 
economically and militarily it is no longer the Russia of 1991.   The Russians view 
themselves as important and deserving, and they feel belittled and written off by the West.  
Their goals in the grander scheme of global politics and influence are not as aggressive as 
they appear at face value, but their implementation is contrary to the Western understanding 
of political and diplomatic posturing.  That has resulted in a significant misunderstanding of 
Rusisan objectives and potential actions.  This has translated into policy actions that, at least 
in some theaters, pose serious potential consequences for security and stability.   
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Russian Military Expansion 
 An interactive New York Times article from 2015 provides the most comprehensive 
look at Russian military expansion in recent years.  A steadily increasing military budget 
from roughly $10 billion (USD) in 2005 to just over $50 billion (USD) in 2015, and a single 
year budget increase of $11 billion (USD) from 2014 to 2015 have played a significant role 
in Russia’s expanded military aggression.
191
  The increased funds have been used, in part, to 
build and/or update 18 military bases in the Arctic region, ensuring Russia maintains a level 
of influence as ice caps in the region recede.
192
  The role of the Arctic was in heavy play 
among the US, Canada, and the USSR during the Cold War and it still provides important 
strategic advantages to this day because it is the shortest distance between the superpowers.  
In fact, some long-range patrols are flown over the Arctic and along Canadian and US air 
defense zones, and there are regular naval exercises by all three countries in the region.  
Russia has also used the funding increases to expand and construct Russian bases in 
neighboring countries.  An interactive map compiled by Al Jazeera showing Russian bases 
abroad, along with their purpose and the year established, shows that as of 2015 Russia had 
18 bases outside Russia, all of which are in their near abroad.
193
  Of these bases seven have 
been established since 2008, two are air bases in Belarus and five are military bases dispersed 
between Belarus (one) and Georgia (two each in the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
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that were recognized by Russia as independent following the 2008 war).
194
  In 2014 Russian 
Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu implied to Russian state news agency RIA Novosti
195
  that 
Russia was also planning on expanding to places such as, Cuba, Nicaragua, Singapore, the 
Seychelles, Vietnam, Venezuela, and other countries.
196
  Some facilities would be military 
bases, although the Russian government plans on establishing logistics points for ports of call 
while naval vessels are underway and refueling points for long range strategic bombers while 
on patrol.
197
  This expansion would not only given Russia an increased global presence in the 
form of a blue-water navy
198
 that could project Russian military power, but it would open the 
door for increased expansion in both countries were partnerships were established, or in other 
nations in the region.  It would also provide a strategic jump off point for any other 
operations that Russian forces may, in the future, consider launching.  
 Russia’s increased military expenditures have allowed them to make significant 
upgrades to equipment and weapons systems that had fallen into significant disrepair in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the USSR.  New air, naval, ground, and weapons systems give 
them capabilities more on par with the more advanced Western military powers, including 
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 A blue-water Navy is capable of operating for extended periods of time across the ocean 
and far removed from their own territory.  It requires both afloat and inport logistics services 
around the world (or at least in the area distant operations occur) and is costly in terms of 
logistics and maintenance. 
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the United States.  In fact, Russia plans to modernize 70 percent of its military by 2020 with 
a special focus on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), fixed and rotary wing aircraft, 
tanks, ships and submarines, and a variety of artillery systems that include air defense, 
multiple rocket launchers, and surface to surface missiles.
199
  Some of these will be upgraded 
systems, prolonging their combat life and improving their performance.  Others will be brand 
new equipment meant to compete with the equipment fielded by Western counterparts.  
Some of the new and upgraded systems have already made their combat debut, with Russian 
leaders ensuring that Western powers had a front row seat.   Russia released video footage, 
widely circulated by media outlets, on their Defense Ministry YouTube channel showing 
new cruise missiles being launched by a long-range bomber,
200
 and upgraded but not-yet 
combat-tested cruise missiles being launched from ships in the Caspian sea (with a flight 
map),
201
 and a newly fielded submarine.
202
  Even though sanctions have caused recent 
economic hardships that could slow the progress of modernization initiatives, many upgrades 
and new systems are already completed or near enough to completion that Russia will ensure 
at least some percentage of the systems reach operational status.   
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Russian Defense Ministry, published November 18, 2015, 
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 However, these same sanctions will limit strategic objectives in other areas, including 
the establishment of overseas bases, logistics points, and logistic/supply vessels.  The 
maintenance cycles for ships capable of operating across large expanses of oceans far away 
from home ports are financially taxing, and ensuring deliveries of food and fuel to these 
vessels is even more complicated.  Failing to maintain these vessels significantly decreases 
readiness and operating range, if it was easy there would be significantly more countries with 
blue-water navies.  At this point in time Russian naval forces are capable of conducting blue-
water-type operations for short periods of time but they are unable to support prolonged 
operations far away from friendly territory and ports.  Until further financial stability can 
occur Russia will be unable to develop and sustain a full blown blue-water navy capable of 
approaching U.S. capabilities.    
 Additionally, many of the modernization initiatives have focused on the 
professionalization and readiness of Russian forces themselves, creating a more agile fighting 
force capable of deploying rapidly to multiple operating areas and shifting mission objectives 
as needed.
203
  The professionalization, readiness, and increased flexibility of forces have 
been especially apparent in recent Russian operations.  Russian forces rapidly deployed to 
Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, bringing equipment with them and quickly meeting objectives.  
Russian forces have also, in this period, conducted scheduled and unannounced exercises that 
have seen them efficiently move up to 100,000 or even more troops and their equipment 
throughout Russia.
204
  Finally, Russian forces have participated in ongoing show of force 
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exercises, in the form of various operations, but particularly air patrols.  These are being 
conducted at levels and in locations not seen since the Cold War.  They have, at times, been 
overtly aggressive and dangerous, while at other times they merely seem to serve as a 
reminder that Russian forces are there and capable of acting if need be.   
Western Goals 
 Russia’s treatment as the loser that must accept the desires of Western nations in the 
aftermath of the Soviet collapse, particularly in the European theater, has resulted in 
increasingly aggressive and destabilizing actions by Russia.
205
   Putin’s perception of a total 
disregard of Russian interests in the period since 1991 created a system in which he, an ultra-
nationalist leader, could rise up and inspire nationalism in Russian citizens and speakers both 
at home and even (to a limited extent) in the near abroad.  This overcorrection is now 
manifesting itself in Eastern Europe where Russia is desperately trying to maintain its 
deteriorating influence.   
 Russian rhetoric regarding the European theater has been strong.  Inflammatory 
statements about the tragedy that was the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rightful place of 
Ukraine and Crimea within Russia as “Novorossiya,” and even the U.S. desiring a hot war 
have fed into a mindset that Russia’s goals are to return to those days when Russia ruled over 
its near abroad as one big nation along with its allies and satellite states.  In reality, though, it 
is highly unlikely that Russia truly wants to seize control in its former Soviet republics and 
Warsaw Pact satellite states and recreate the putative glory days of the Soviet Union.  
Instead, Russian goals are probably to increase influence in the region and guarantee 
themselves a prominent seat at the global power players’ table.  The keyword is prominent.  
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Their goal is to be treated as a global equal and not be left out of the proverbial winner’s 
circle that is being created by EU and NATO expansion.    
 Russian rhetoric and the associated initiatives are not, in Russian minds, unprovoked.  
In fact, Russia views these reactions as defensive in nature, meant to counter encroachment 
by the US and NATO.  Russia has made numerous statements regarding this very topic, 
statements that NATO has taken the time to counter in a fact sheet on their website.  Russia 
believes: 
 - NATO is worsening divisions in Europe; 
 - NATO has a Cold War mindset and is trying to encircle Russia; 
 - The larger goal of NATO is to contain, weaken, isolate, and marginalize Russia; 
 - NATO is destabilizing the region and plans to build bases and station equipment in 
    non-NATO countries; 
 - NATO poses a direct threat to Russia through its worldwide bases, actions,     




These issues run contrary to Western sentiments, so much so that NATO took the time to 
counter every accusation.  Their responses, based on their perspectives and world view, are 
rational and logical.  For Russia they are simply excuses meant to conceal the truth, which is 
of course all the accusations Russia’s leadership has made based on its own perspectives and 
worldview.  And who should understand this better than Russia, a nation more than willing to 
spout shockingly blatant falsehoods and pretend that they are absolutely truthful.  From the 
Russians’ perspective, NATO is just as guilty as they are.  But NATO will not admit it, so 
Russia raises a second category of issues with NATO—issues  that do not directly impact 
Russia but are meant to undermine the legitimacy and capabilities of NATO, especially in the 
eyes of those outside of its direct sphere of influence.   
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 Russia’s second category of accusations against NATO falls squarely into the 
argument of NATO failing at its missions and lacking legitimacy.  The accusations include: 
 - NATO violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty through multiple excercises and    
   arrangements; 
 - NATO violated its own policies in responding to Russian actions in Ukraine; 
 - NATO renigged on its own guarantees to not expand east after the Cold War; 
 - NATO should have been disbanded after the Cold War; 
 - NATO expansion is following the same process as the expansion of the USSR and 
   Warsaw Pactbefore their collapse in 1989-1991; 
 - NATO took illegitimate action in Kosovo and Libya; 
 - NATO was hypocritical regarding Crimea, which was identical to Kosovo and    
   justified based on the opinion of the International Court of Justice’s decision on    
   the independence of Kosovo; 
 - NATO failed in Afghanistan both militarily and with stopping the drug trade; 
 - NATO attempted to force Ukraine into the alliance, provoked the Euromaidan, and 




These accusations are not meant to do internal damage to NATO, though that would 
undoubtedly be a positive outcome for Russia.  Instead, the accusations would ideally cause 
foreign countries contemplating NATO membership or closer partnerships with NATO to 
reconsider.  If a country felt that the NATO alliance would undermine its national 
sovereignty or would disregard some international norms and standards, it may turn away 
from the alliance and possibly toward Russia.  This argument would ideally ensure more 
countries do not join NATO, while also hopefully moving some toward the idea of joining 
Russia’s own Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  These of course lead into 
Russia’s third set of statements regarding NATO.   
 The third type of statement Russia has made regarding NATO is based heavily on the 
foundation laid by the previous two of NATO posing a threat to Russia and lacking 
legitimacy.  This third statement of principleshas to do with Russia’s own rights, which its 





leaders believe are infringed on by NATO and are similar to the rules NATO has written for 
itself.  Russians believe:  
 - They have a right to oppose NATO-supported infrastructure in Central and Eastern 
    European member states; 
  - They have the right to a “100% guarantee” that Ukraine (or probably any other    




These demands show Russia’s true goals, which were mentioned earlier: that Russia be 
treated as a central and equal player on the European stage, that it deserves to be at the main 
table as opposed to the outer circle.  Russia does not want membership in NATO, at least not 
Russia under Putin.  Instead, Russia just wants to hold an equal amount of power and 
influence.  Russians have been forced to the outside since the start of the Cold War, and after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union they were left out as their former allies were drawn into the 
Western embrace.  Russia was shunned, and its leaders want to change that and be shown the 
respect they believe Russia deserves.   
Western Security 
 Their method of achieving this goal is, in classic Russian fashion, bearish and off-
putting.  Instead of cementing their influence, they are alienating the very people with whom 
they wish to become equals and potentially pushing the region closer to crisis.  Russia does 
not want to be part of NATO.  Russia does not want to fight a hot war with NATO.  Russia 
probably does not even want to be involved in another Cold War with NATO.  Russia just 
wants to be a central power.  However, Western leaders seem unable to come up with a way 
to draw Russia in to their “winner’s circle.”  So Russia has become more aggressive and is 
trying to force its way in.  This is in turn further alienating Russia from Western states and 





other organizations which, instead of engaging Russia, continue to belittle Russian actions 
and thus widen the rift.  There is probably no going back in regards to Ukraine unless the 
West comes to the table with Russia and brokers a peace deal that gives eastern Ukraine a 
significant level of autonomy, if not independence.  However, any negotations with eastern 
Ukraine must involve Russia, or risk further aggravating the situation.  Additionally, Russia 
may need to be drawn closer to NATO and the EU to ease concerns regarding the 
organization.  This could be effectively accomplished through joint exercises meant to 
address the issue of terrorism in Europe, a security concern for all sides that truly needs a 
coherent response.   
 The more likely scenario is that Russia will not be effectively engaged by Western 
leaders.  This is because there is concern that by engaging Russia, the West will validate its 
leaders’ actions and simply prompt them to begin pushing for more and taking their 
aggressive actions further and further.  Western hesitation is understandable in this regard.  If 
eastern Ukraine were granted independence Russia may attempt similar actions in Poland or 
the Baltics.  They also may push back harder on the issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 
Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova.  This would violate the territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of Georgia and Moldova even more so than has already occurred, and give other 
countries the perspective that Western groups are unwilling to act in their interests.   
 Without engagement, Russia will continue to take subversive action meant to 
undermine the countries in its crosshairs.  The Russians may provide increasingly lethal 
weapons to eastern Ukrainian rebels or pro-Assad forces, resulting in a significant accident or 
attack.  They may overcommit forces to eastern Ukraine, resulting in a dedication of Western 
forces to the fight and bringing on a hot war.  They may even get overly confident and take 
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action in a NATO member nation that would then undoubtedly invoke Article 5.  Whether 
the collective defense concept would include commitment of forces or just diplomatic 
measures remains to be seen even though Article 5 says explicitly that all countries will come 
to the defense of any member state that is attacked.  A Cold War standoff, pitting East 
against West, may even occur.  But there is one scenario that seems most plausible.  This 
involves prolonged subversion and interference in former Soviet states in particular but also 
possibly former Warsaw Pact nations that create economic and political instability that never 
turns hot, but also avoids cold war.  These campaigns of “controlled instability,” as the 
Russians now call then,  are a gray area of sorts—diplomatic  stand offs with both sides 
cautiously avoiding any real clear or definitive lines of action.  There would be no threat of 
mutually assured destruction, just sanctions and strong rhetoric.  Russia would undermine the 
political integrity of nations that do not align with it and create unrest in these nations.  
Weapons shipments, though not on the scale of eastern Ukraine, would go to separatist 
groups who would wage an insurgency of sorts.  Countries would suffer politically and 
economically, unable to regain control unless a pro-Russian government comes to power.  
Russia would vehemenetly deny any involvement, regardless of the occasionally blatant 
evidence, and operate on the adage of “admit nothing, deny everything, make 
counteraccusations” until Western nations decide to give up that portion of the fight.  This 
has the potential to undermine not only the stability of the nation Russia is targeting but 
could also undermine the larger economic and political stability of neighboring nations and 
the EU.   
 Much has been made of the devastating blow Russia could deal to the Baltics, and 
NATO, if it invaded with mechanized units.  Rand Corporation surmised after tabletop 
104 
 
games and scenarios that “across multiple games using a wide range of expert participants in 
and out of uniform playing both sides, the longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the 
outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of Tallinn and Riga, respectively, is 60 
hours.  Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad.”
209
   
While it is undoubtedly true that NATO forces in the region are not enough to stop a full 
Russian assault, this does not mean that a full Russian assault is the most feasible scenario.  It 
gives the appearance of having been “red teamed,” a method in which analysts will act as 
devil’s advocates or given alternate scenarios that are recognized as highly unlikely but still 
something leaders should recognize as a possibility.  However, the authors stray away from 
red teaming when they surmise that while not likely, “Moscow’s recent behavior suggests 
that NATO should take the prospect sufficiently seriously to at least evaluate the 
requirements for deterring and, if necessary, defeating Russian adventurism.”
210
  And they 
are not inaccurate: It is possible.  However, there are endless, more plausible scenarios that 
have already been mentioned.  Ultimately, a hot war does not benefit Russia in any way.  The 
Russians would most likely lose significantly more in terms of economic and political 
influence then they could possibly gain, even if the conflict ended in a draw.  In a war 
between Russia and the West no one would walk away a winner.  Russia would undoubtedly 
face insurgencies on the ground in countries they invaded, while also engaging in 
conventional fighting with Western forces.  Time has proven that conventional forces 
struggle to effectively fight insurgencies, particularly over the long term. Add the 
                                                          
209
 David A. Shlapak and Michael Johnson, “Reinforcing Detterence on NATO’s Eastern 




 Ibid, 16. 
105 
 
complexities of an insurgency to a constant conventional engagement and the war becomes 
almost entirely not worth the effort.  Losses on both sides would be significant and, if any 
nuclear or other kinds of WMD were to be deployed, have the potential to outstrip even the 
devastation that World War II caused in Europe.  That is why the new conflict would be 
neither cold, nor hot; instead, it would be a psychological, geopolitical proxy war that 
occasionally gets warm but never reaches the boiling point. 
Russia’s Middle East Strategic & Security Goals 
 The Middle East is merely an extension of Russian policy in Europe and the Caucasus 
region.  The region provides another avenue by which Russians can insert themselves into 
global events and make themselves central to the solutions.  The long-running relationship 
Russia has with Syria, and the manner in which it has linked itself to Assad, ensures that 
Russia is central to any resolution in the region and thus has influence over international 
security agreements.
211
  Russia’s role in removing chemical weapons from Syria, while met 
with hesitation by many in the West, was another way of asserting its role in the larger issue.  
In fact, Russia has used Syria to reestablish relations with the West, which it had largely 
ended over the Ukraine problem, a tactic that some have pointed out seems to be working.
212
  
This is  not to say Russia does not have its own set of interests in Syria.  Russian leaders 
most certainly have geographic and economic interests that hinge on the outcome of the Civil 
War.  But those interests are only a piece of a much larger issue of global influence.   
 While Russian support for Assad has resulted in multiple issues with the West, 
particularly because of the targeting of Western backed rebels, it is probably not destabilizing 
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for the region at large.  In fact, if Russia could only turn its fire power to focus primarily on 
ISIS, as well as using its influence with Assad to broker a transition of power, it could 
improve some things in the region.  The reality, particularly where the Middle East is 
concerned, must be that the solution is comprehensive between all parties, and Russia is the 
country with the most influence over Assad.  Russia could easily be allowed to maintain 
relations with Syria in terms of weapons transfers and the port of Tartus, and they could help 
usher in a less despotic form of leadership by pressuring Assad to work more effectively to 
address the issues in the country, including his tyrannical treatment of toward Sunnis and 
other outside groups.  
 With regards to Russian goals in the Middle East, the West has much to gain if it can 
broker some sort of arrangement.  Allowing Russia to exert its influence could make it feel 
valuable and valued as a world player, and it could open the door to resolving issues in 
Europe, a goal Russia seems to have.  Granted, resolution of the crisis in Syria may not look 
the same to both sides, but there is a middle ground that everyone would greatly benefit from 
meeting, and Russia holds a very important key to that middle ground.   
Global Goals & Security 
 The bulk of Russia’s focus is on their near abroad, but that is not to say they do not 
have global interests and goals.  As was mentioned regarding both Europe and the Middle 
East, Russia wants to be a power player  with a central role in resolving issues.  Indications 
by the Russian defense minister that they are seeking bases and partnerships with nations in 
the Americas and the Pacific hint to global aspirations for influence.  This has two ways it 
can play out, and the result depends heavily on how Western leaders and diplomats handle 
the process.  They can either seek to further alienate Russia, probably driving Russia to a 
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more extreme position in places like Cuba and Vietnam, or they can initiate meaningful 
engagement with Russia on issues in those areas.  Russia is probably better positioned to 
assist in dealing with nations like North Korea, China, and Cuba than is any Western nation.  
The authoritarian similarities between the regimes make leaders in these countries more 
likely to listen to and engage with their Russian counterparts.  If the West can become 
inclusive toward Russia it could at least thaw some of the pervasive issues in these regions.   
 Ultimately, any sort of hostile relationship between Russia and the West does more 
harm then good.  It allows historic divides to fester like a wound that cannot heal, developing 
infection that spreads and does significant damage.  Instead of continuing to treat Russia 
within an “us versus them” scenario that harkens back to the Cold War, Western leaders 
should seek to engage Russia in a meaningful way.  If they fail to do this, Russia will only 
push itself further away, inflaming tensions and creating a deteriorating security situation.  It 
is a scenario in which Russia has proven time and again that it is willing to engage, though it 
does not seem to be the priority right now.  Russian leaders, for all their bravado, recognize 
that the Soviet Union cannot dominate the world.  Their goal is not to bring back the Soviet 
Union, but rather to have the level of influence that they had as the Soviet Union.  The 





 Russia is a complex country that has demonstrated an innate ability to influence 
international events and challenge international order on a large and at times frightening 
scale.  Russia’s willingness to take aggressive actions and escalate situations relating to their 
neighbors has created a perspective of Russia as a country that always seems to be trying to 
outmaneuver and overpower its neighbors.  Recent history does not do much to disprove this 
concept.  Reardless of intentions or goals there is no denying that Russia is willing to violate 
international norms and mores to achieve strategic aims.  This does not mean that we 
currently teeter on the brink of war, regardless of characterizations that suggest otherwise.  In 
fact, those characterizations might be purposeful, attempting to frighten the other side away 
from the brink and toward diplomatic resolution.  Brinksmanship is not a good way to handle 
diplomacy, but when examining Russian actions it is also not entirely unreasonable from 
their perspective.   
 It is also important to note that the current situations involving Russia are extremely 
fluid.  Between the completion of the first and second drafts of chapter six of this document – 
a two day period – Palmyra had fallen to Assad’s forces with the support of Russian troops 
who had been “withdrawan” weeks earlier, and reports were coming out regarding increased 
cargo shipments and naval presence in the Mediterranean near Syria.  The current situations 
in Eastern Europe and the Middle East could play out in many different ways.  It is possible, 
though unlikely, that larger wars could break out in the near future.  It is more likely that the 
status quo will be maintained but that Eastern European stability will continue to deteriorate.  
A truce could be reached in eastern Ukraine, or fighting could experience another increase as 
the weather warms in the region.  At this point there are no reliable indications in the press 
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regarding how this will ultimately play out.  Scholars and experts can and will try and 
understand what the implications are of daily developments, policy makers and military 
leaders will continue to seek out information that can guide their own policy and strategies in 
the most effective way.  Only time will tell what happens next, and hopefully it will not be 
anything like a repeat of the not-so-distant past. 
 What we can say with confidence is that Russians have long been and will long be 
Russians, and they will act in ways driven by deep context, strategic culture, and their view 
of other states and players in the world, and particularly in their near abroad.  If policymakers 
and intelligence analysts, among others, hold to these fundamental aspects of what it means 
to be Russian, and how these dynamics drive Russian behavior, the United States and other 
western countries will have a much higher likelihood of keeping Russia in check.  Only by 
offering the olive branch from a position of strength built on understanding, strategic 
patience, and firmness can the United States and its allies not only check Russian aggression 
and expansionism, but also begin to build a great level of mutual understanding and fair 
dealing.  This outcome would benefit all countries and peoples with any kind of stake in the 
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